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EXPLAINING “BAIT-AND-SWITCH” REGULATION 
DAVID ADAM FRIEDMAN* 
ABSTRACT 
“Bait and switch” can describe a range of commercial behaviors com-
mon in the everyday marketplace, but virtually ignored in the academic 
literature. The traditional definition of unlawful bait and switch applies to 
insincere offers to sell one item in order to induce the buyer to purchase 
another. Certain sellers have historically employed bait-and-switch tactics, 
including urban retailers, aluminum siding companies, and supermarkets. 
Colloquially, this definition can also cover lawful or other borderline 
sales tactics, including the use of teaser rates or low introductory pricing, 
or even “free offers.” Even common lawful tactics, like the deliberate routing 
of customers past other retail displays on their way to purchase high-volume 
or featured items, may involve “bait” to induce other purchases. 
Why are some of these behaviors lawful and others unlawful? In this 
Article, I examine several different flavors of bait-and-switch tactics, ex-
ploring the underlying behaviors behind the tactics and the welfare impli-
cations of regulating them. Looking to the literature on commercial custom 
and norms, I find a pattern showing that bait-and-switch practices that align 
with custom and norms tend to be lawful, and those that do not tend to be 
unlawful. Welfare advancement seemingly plays a distant secondary role in 
explaining bait-and-switch regulation. 
My finding should compel regulators to consider whether the goal of 
elevating the market atmosphere by banning offensive behavior should trump 
welfare concerns. Further, my conclusion can also help advocates shape 
more effective arguments for adjusting trade practice regulation. 
                                                 
* Assistant Professor of Law, Willamette University College of Law; B.A., J.D., Yale 
University. Thank you to Laura Appleman, Curtis Bridgeman, Wendy Netter Epstein, 
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INTRODUCTION 
On the Golden Gate [University School of Law] campus recently, a 
group of first-year students at risk of losing their [merit] scholarships 
were trying to make sense of the system .... [T]he phrase “bait and 
switch” came up a lot. Several assumed that they were given what is es-
sentially a discount to get them in the door. 
“I had a friend once who told me that hunting is a sport,” said one 
Golden Gate merit grant winner who anticipated coming up shy of a 3.0 
average. “I said, ‘Hunting is not a sport.’ He said: ‘Sure it’s a sport. It’s 
just that the animals don’t know they’re in a game.’ That’s what it feels 
like to be a law student these days. You have no idea you’re in a game.”1 
When do bait-and-switch tactics cross the line from “fair sport” to “tur-
key shoot”? A range of bait-and-switch tactics emerge in the marketplace. 
Some have been deemed lawful fair sport, and others have been deemed un-
lawful “turkey shoots.” Extending the metaphor, the formal hunting rules 
appear to reflect a sense of norms and imbued marketplace customs. Just as 
real hunting rules are driven by custom, norms, and formal regulation, so 
are rules about sales tactics. In this Article, I find that custom and norms2 
                                                 
1 David Segal, Behind the Curve: How Law Students Lose the Grant Game, and How 
Their Schools Win, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2011, at BU1 (emphasis added). Just over one 
year after this New York Times article appeared, the American Bar Association House of 
Delegates promulgated a disclosure requirement for conditional scholarships at law schools. 
See Debra Cassens Weiss, No Fudging: Revised Standard Bars Law Schools from 
Publishing Misleading Consumer Info, A.B.A. J. (Aug. 6, 2012, 10:46 AM), http://www
.abajournal.com/news/article/no_fudging_revised_standard_bars_law_schools_from_pub
lishing_misleadin/; 2012–2013 ABA STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL 
OF LAW SCHOOLS 39, Standard 509(e) (2012) [hereinafter Standard 509(e)]. Part III.C.2 
discusses this standard in detail. 
2 In Roman law, custom was defined as “a repeat behavior to which the relevant 
majority of the community had tacitly consented to be bound to perform.” Emily Kadens, 
The Myth of the Customary Law Merchant, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1153, 1163 (2012). See 
generally id. at 1163–67 (discussing the evolving historical definitions of commercial 
custom). Richard Posner defines norms as “rule[s] that [are] neither promulgated by an 
official source, such as a court or a legislature, nor enforced by the threat of legal 
sanctions, yet [are] regularly complied with,” like rules of etiquette. Richard A. Posner, 
Social Norms and the Law: An Economic Approach, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 365, 365 
(1997). For a compendium of articles about the role and influence of social norms, see 
generally ERIC A. POSNER, SOCIAL NORMS, NONLEGAL SANCTIONS, AND THE LAW (2007) 
[hereinafter POSNER, SOCIAL NORMS]. I often use the terms “customs” and “norms” 
interchangeably because they all work together to guide formal approaches toward 
regulation in this area. There are obviously significant distinctions between custom and 
norms, but for the purpose of this Article, the distinctions matter less. I observe that 
however defined, tradition and mores, as embedded in custom and norms, collectively 
explain which bait-and-switch-like tactics are deemed unlawful. Custom and norms are 
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drive the approach toward formal regulation of bait-and-switch tactics more 
than welfare advancement.3 The cultural explanation of commercial regula-
tion can be identified in the history of commercial regulation4 and, I will 
argue, can be used to explain current regulation and to predict and guide its 
future. I use bait and switch to illustrate these dynamics. 
Though custom and norms tend to explain our regulatory regime more 
closely than the construct of welfare advancement,5 this phenomenon might 
not always lead to the most desirable social result. Reinforcement of norms 
may correspond with notions of fairness, which may diverge from welfare 
advancement.6 This is not to say that reinforcing custom comes without 
benefits. A triumph of custom may vindicate the idea that certain rules are 
worth the welfare price because they elevate the morality and the fairness of 
the marketplace.7 
In the consumer environment, persuasive and creative sales tactics are 
perpetually invented and deployed, and regulators are left to discern which 
                                                                                                                         
often discussed and distinguished together, but they both influence commercial culture. 
See Kadens, supra note 2, at 1166–67 & n.36. H.L.A. Hart noted the reality that “custom 
is law only if it is one of a class of customs which is ‘recognized’ as law by a particular 
legal system.” H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 44–45 (2d ed. 1994); see also K.N. 
LLEWELLYN & E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY: CONFLICT AND CASE LAW 
IN PRIMITIVE JURISPRUDENCE 275 (William S. Hein & Co., 2002) (1941) (noting that 
customs and mores “fuse and confuse the notion of ‘practice’ (... actual behavior) with 
the notion of ‘standard’ (... an ideal of ... the proper line of actual behavior)”). Again, I 
acknowledge this confusion identified by Llewellyn, but put it aside for the purposes of 
this Article. I embrace the general notion that customs, mores, and norms all, in their own 
way, guide the formalization of our approach toward bait and switch. 
3 For the foundational, classic principles of welfare economics, see generally PAUL 
ANTHONY SAMUELSON, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMICS ANALYSIS 203–53 (1947). 
4 For a discussion of the role of custom and norms in the drafting of Article 2 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code, see infra Part II.A.1. 
5 The very limited economic literature evaluating the regulation of bait and switch pro-
vides thin guidance about the welfare impact, though, as I discuss in Part I.B, the weight 
of the conjecture leads to a tentative conclusion that regulation should advance welfare in 
the traditional scenario. For the literature on point, compare Eitan Gerstner & James D. 
Hess, Can Bait and Switch Benefit Consumers?, 9 MARKETING SCI. 114, 114 (1990) [here-
inafter Gerstner & Hess I], with William L. Wilkie et al., Does “Bait and Switch” Really 
Benefit Consumers?, 17 MARKETING SCI. 273, 273–74 (1998) [hereinafter Wilkie et al. 
I]. In reply to Wilkie et al. I, see James D. Hess & Eitan Gerstner, Yes, “Bait and Switch” 
Really Benefits Consumers, 17 MARKETING SCI. 283, 283–84 (1998) [hereinafter Hess & 
Gerstner II], and in reply to Hess & Gerstner, II, see William L. Wilkie et al., Does “Bait 
and Switch” Really Benefit Consumers? Advancing the Discussion ..., 17 MARKETING 
SCI. 290, 290–91 (1998) [hereinafter Wilkie et al. II]. 
6 See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961, 
1035 (2001). 
7 See id. at 1035–38. 
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tactics are deceptive. Choosing where and when to regulate common mar-
ket activities can have a large impact. Consumer transactions are the fun-
damental lifeblood of the economy and, in aggregate, advance welfare.8 
Government claims the responsibility of promoting the flow of accurate 
information “without unduly burdening legitimate business activity.”9 Bait 
and switch plays a significant role in the market, but the legal literature 
ignores not just the tactic, but what can be learned from examining it. 
Of course, with bait and switch, definition of the tactic presents a critical 
starting point. Bait and switch is frequently used to describe a range of com-
mercial behaviors, only some of which meet the legal criteria for deception 
under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act).10 For the 
purposes of this Article, I expand the scope of the term “bait and switch” 
beyond the legal definition to include scenarios where consumers are lured 
in with a low-price introductory offer and are later locked in to paying a po-
tentially higher price for the same offer.11 Some of these tactics are omni-
present and lawful, but others have been designated unlawful by the Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC),12 by federal statute,13 by state regulation,14 and 
are also held in disfavor by common law doctrines.15 
The aforementioned “hunted” scholarship students at Golden Gate em-
braced “bait-and-switch” terminology.16 They felt like they had bought an 
                                                 
8 See generally SAMUELSON, supra note 3, at 203–53. 
9 The Federal Trade Commission declares these goals within its mission and vision. 
About the Federal Trade Commission, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (Jan. 5, 2012), http://
www.ftc.gov/ftc/about.shtm. 
10 See 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012). 
11 Examples of these include “free offers,” credit card rate hikes, and, for the sake of 
argument, law school merit scholarships, discussed infra Part III.C. 
12 See Guides Against Bait Advertising, 16 C.F.R. § 238 (2012). I focus primarily on 
distinctions made by the FTC, examining the tactics that it has deemed unlawful through 
Guidelines and civil actions. 
13 See, e.g., Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure (CARD) Act of 2009, 
Pub. L. No. 111-24, 123 Stat. 1734, 1735–36, 1738 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
14 See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17500 (West 2012); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW 
§ 396.1 (McKinney 2012); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b)(9)–(10) (West 2012). 
15 Such doctrines include fraud, unconscionability, and unilateral mistake. See infra 
notes 39–42. 
16 The Golden Gate students’ bait-and-switch label went “viral.” See, e.g., Debra Cassens 
Weiss, Bait and Switch? Law Schools Gain in US News with Merit Scholarships Conditioned 
on High Grades, A.B.A. J. (May 2, 2011, 7:34 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news
/article/bait_and_switch_law_schools_gain_in_us_news_with_merit_scholarships_conditi/; 
Nathan Koppel, Are Law Schools Deceiving Students by Offering Merit Scholarships?, 
WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (May 2, 2011, 11:31 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/05/02/are
-law-school-deceiving-students-by-offering-merit-scholarships/ (“Students accuse some schools 
of a bait and switch ....”). 
580 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:575 
offering at a low price only to be switched to a higher price, but they were 
not really alleging the deployment of a traditional bait-and-switch tactic. 
The FTC defines “bait” as 
an alluring but insincere offer to sell a product or service which the 
advertiser in truth does not intend or want to sell. Its purpose is to switch 
consumers from buying the advertised merchandise, in order to sell 
something else, usually at a higher price or on a basis more advantageous 
to the advertiser.17 
These students,18 as I will discuss, may have been “allured,” but they were 
not “switched.” 
My definition of bait and switch includes the FTC definition, but ex-
pands it to apply to a range of tactics that offend general marketplace sensi-
bilities. I discuss a number of these tactics, including a hypothetical of an 
auto dealer advertising a car just to lure customers to the lot,19 the real case 
of a retailer that frequently promoted a special offering to drive store traffic 
but rarely actually sold it on those terms,20 and the company that required 
in-home salespersons to disparage big-ticket promoted goods to encourage 
the sale of higher-margin goods.21 
Although they may not be explicitly labeled as such in a legal context, 
other forms of bait and switch exist, are regulated differently, and evoke 
different market customs. For example, “free offers” lure the attention of 
consumers to a packaged promotion. The FTC requires a free offeror to dis-
close conspicuously why an offer is not truly “free.”22 That is, after luring 
attention to an advertisement, the offeror presents the entirety of the sales 
story. This presents the market with a different sort of “switch,” a lawful 
switch, but a bait and switch nonetheless. Despite constituting a form of bait 
and switch, courts and regulators have been unwilling to eschew this old 
and established custom, though a plain look at free offers reveals that they 
interfere with consumer cognition. Stronger regulation that departs from the 
custom might conceivably advance welfare.23 
                                                 
17 Guides Against Bait Advertising, 16 C.F.R. § 238.0 (2012). 
18 Again, in 2011, these students transacted without disclosures mandated by ABA Stan-
dard 509(e). 
19 See infra Part I.B.1. 
20 See infra Part III.A.3. 
21 See infra Part III.A.2. 
22 See Guide Concerning Use of the Word “Free” and Similar Representations, 16 
C.F.R. § 251 (2012). 
23 See generally David Adam Friedman, Free Offers: A New Look, 38 N.M. L. REV. 49 
(2008) [hereinafter Friedman, Free Offers] (describing the history of free offer regulation, 
the regulatory embrace of the free offer, and the cognitive distortions that free offers induce). 
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Also outside the formal bait-and-switch definition, but perhaps within 
its popular definition, are “teasers”—low-price introductory offers that can 
be used to lure consumers into arrangements where the terms can turn dra-
matically against their favor once they are locked in. The history of credit 
card rate regulation provides a high-profile example. The Credit Card Ac-
countability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 200924 (CARD Act) ap-
plied the brakes on well-established customary tactics. Historically, banks 
would dangle low rates to acquire customers and later raise the rate on their 
balances.25 The CARD Act embodiment of bait-and-switch-like regulation 
provides further opportunity to explore how underlying economic and polit-
ical forces can suddenly change the deep customs and culture associated 
with a set of business practices. 
If one accepts the factual basis of the law students’ 2011 allegations,26 
Golden Gate could have been offering a “teaser,” but could not be said to be 
engaging in unlawful bait-and-switch behavior. The school sincerely in-
tended to offer the students additional educational services, and did not in-
tend to use the initial offering to “switch” the students to purchase some-
thing different. The students cried foul about a change in price that they felt 
resulted from a misleading initial offer. The argument about law school 
merit scholarships mirrors27 some of the problems addressed by the CARD 
Act. Understanding the cultural dynamics that drove Congress to regulate 
bait-and-switch practices with sudden severity might prove instructive for 
understanding how students may have effected a modest change in law 
school merit scholarship practices.28 If custom and culture drive regulation 
                                                 
24 See generally Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure (CARD) Act of 
2009, Pub. L. No. 111-24, 123 Stat. 1734 (2012) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
25 See infra Part III.C for historical context. 
26 The Golden Gate University Law School students have filed a class action lawsuit in 
California Superior Court that largely centers on false advertising and unfair competition related 
to job-placement and starting salary data. See Class Action Complaint at 2-4, 9-16, Arring v. 
Golden Gate Univ., No. CGC-12-517837 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 1, 2012), available at http://www 
.anziskalaw.com/uploads/Filed_Golden_Gate_Complaint.pdf [hereinafter Complaint]. The law 
school merit scholarship issue is mentioned briefly in the Complaint, and the New York Times 
article, Segal, supra note 1, is attached to the Complaint as the first exhibit. See Complaint, supra 
note 26, at 10–11, Exhibit 1. The two paragraphs of the Complaint that focus on the merit 
scholarship draw on the article’s profile of Golden Gate graduate Alexandra Leumer, but 
Leumer is not a lead plaintiff. See id. 
27 I use the present tense because it is unclear if the “argument” has ended. 
28 Standard 509(e) requires disclosure about conditional scholarships with a focus on 
presenting scholarship retention data to the public and to scholarship offerees. Standard 
509(e), supra note 1. Mandated disclosure may not always help consumers, as I discuss 
infra Part III.C.2. It remains unclear whether students would seek to eliminate conditional 
scholarships entirely in favor of a more certain financial aid structure. See id. 
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more so than welfare advancement, the roadmap to change, including the 
obstacles, is clearer. 
Each flavor of bait-and-switch regulation provides an opportunity to 
explore the ways we have permitted custom to prevail over welfare ad-
vancement. In Part I, to provide grounding, I describe the current regulato-
ry approach toward bait and switch. In Part II, I provide an overview of the 
theory undergirding the role norms and customs play in commercial regula-
tion. In Part III, I examine three distinct categories of bait-and-switch be-
havior and regulation to assess whether they reinforce norms or customs and 
whether the regulatory approach promotes welfare advancement. In Part 
III.A, I examine “traditional” bait-and-switch regulation, as the FTC de-
fines it, including special rules for retail grocers. In Part III.B, I analyze 
“free offer regulation,” and in Part III.C, “teaser” regulation via the CARD 
Act and first-year law school merit scholarships, respectively. I also dis-
cuss “lawful” forms of bait and switch and the role of custom in Part III.D. 
In Part IV, I globally assess the interplay between custom, norms, and wel-
fare advancement in the regulation of broader bait-and-switch practices, 
and describe why this approach endures. 
Below, I will outline the role of bait-and-switch regulation in our con-
sumer economy. I then follow with a discussion of how the role of custom 
in commercial regulation informs discussion about the social welfare cost 
of custom in bait-and-switch regulation. Ultimately, I conclude that the pri-
macy of custom and norms should compel policymakers to carefully con-
sider the welfare impact of commercial regulations—and should inform ad-
vocates about how to influence regulatory change. 
I. CURRENT BAIT-AND-SWITCH REGULATION 
Bait-and-switch tactics are an effective tool for sellers to generate trans-
actions, but the custom belying the regulation varies by context. For the 
purposes of the Article, I refer to the FTC’s definition of bait and switch 
as “traditional bait and switch.” The lawfulness of a “traditional bait and 
switch” is determined by some measure of the “sincerity” of the promoted 
offer. For enforcement purposes, lawfulness is, in part, discerned by the 
propriety of disclosure to the consumer about the nature of the “bait.”29 
The custom and norm would naturally be to regard “insincere” offers as 
ill-mannered. The public might associate unscrupulous retailers30 and slick 
                                                 
29 I describe this regulatory scheme in more detail in Part III.D. 
30 See, e.g., In re Leon A. Tashof, 74 F.T.C. 1361, 1362–63 (1968), aff’d, 437 F.2d 707, 
709 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (regarding bait and switch involving cheap eyeglasses), discussed 
infra Part III.A.3. 
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sales forces31 with these practices, and our stern regulation of traditional bait 
and switch matches this norm against insincerity.32 For example, in the late 
1960s, the FTC viewed bait and switch in retail grocery through the lens 
of the War on Poverty and regulated aggressively to meet that norm.33 The 
FTC later pulled back on retail grocery regulation in the 1980s era where 
deregulation became the ethos.34 Economic studies were used to support 
the initial regulation and the later deregulation, but even the very choice of 
the line of economic inquiry reveals that regulators were concerned with 
prevailing norms.35 
Marketing tactics are, of course, designed to induce consumers to trans-
act. If a transaction occurs, the parties make an exchange because the sub-
jective value of what they receive from each other exceeds the value of what 
they give in return. Such an exchange advances social welfare.36 
Rational choice theory often explains behavior that deviates from utility 
maximization as resulting from market failures like monopoly and informa-
tional asymmetries.37 Bait-and-switch practices can indeed tamper with the 
information flow and exploit the structure of the market.38 These impurities 
can spoil the market and potentially destroy welfare.39 If sellers are deceptive, 
buyers should subsequently experience frustration in realizing the subjective 
value they expected. 
                                                 
31 See, e.g., All-State Indus. of N.C., Inc. v. F.T.C., 423 F.2d 423, 425 (4th Cir. 1970); In re 
S. States Dist. Co., 83 F.T.C. 1126, 1127–29 (1973) (regarding bait and switch involving sale of 
home improvement products), discussed infra Part III.A.1 and Part III.A.2, respectively. 
32  However, the FTC separated retail grocers from the traditional bait-and-switch 
regulatory umbrella. See Retail Food Store Advertising and Marketing Practices, 16 C.F.R. 
§ 424.2. In 1971, the FTC promulgated stricter guidelines for retail grocers but loosened them 
in 1989, using economic justifications at both junctures. I discuss this separate regulatory 
approach in detail, infra Part III.A.4. 
33 See generally STAFF REPORT TO THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, ECONOMIC REPORT 
ON FOOD CHAIN SELLING PRACTICES IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA AND SAN FRANCISCO 
(1969) [hereinafter ECONOMIC REPORT ON FOOD CHAIN SELLING] (on file with author). 
34 See infra Part III.A.4, discussing the intersection between the cultural attitude to-
ward regulation and retail grocer bait and switch. 
35 See infra Part III.A.4, discussing norms in retail grocery regulation. 
36 See 1 LUDWIG VON MISES, HUMAN ACTION: A TREATISE ON ECONOMICS 203–04 (rev. 
ed. 1963) (“People buy and sell only because they appraise the things given up less than 
those received.”). 
37 See Thomas S. Ulen, Rational Choice Theory in Law and Economics, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 790, 793–94 (2000). 
38 A dominant retailer can effectively manipulate a set of buyers that have an absence of a 
meaningful transactional alternative, diminishing the natural salutary effects of competition. 
39 See Howard Beales, Richard Craswell & Steven Salop, The Efficient Regulation of 
Consumer Information, 24 J. L. & ECON. 491, 505–06 (1981). 
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Though common law provides general avenues for these buyers to re-
dress these deception scenarios 40  (through defenses like fraud, 41  uncon-
scionability,42 and unilateral mistake43), regulation also directs behavior in 
the marketplace. In this instance, section 5 of the FTC Act declares unlaw-
ful “[u]nfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce,”44 providing rulemak-
ing45 and enforcement authority46 to the FTC. 
Bait-and-switch guidance and enforcement fall within this anti-deception 
regime. The FTC has promulgated guides as to what constitutes bait-and-
switch deception,47 and has enforced bait-and-switch cases under section 
5.48 The states also offer protection against bait and switch through “little 
FTC Acts,” often providing private remedies.49 The state bait-and-switch 
laws tend to mirror the federal approach,50 so I focus on the FTC’s action 
in this area. In Part I.A, I describe the FTC’s guidance. In Part I.B, I dis-
cuss the welfare economics of bait and switch and explore the limited lit-
erature on the subject. A basic understanding of “traditional” bait-and-switch 
regulation will set a baseline for the discussion of the welfare impact. 
A. FTC Guidance on Bait and Switch 
The FTC’s “Guides Against Bait Advertising”51 provide sellers with a 
crisp outline of how the FTC internally defines a violation of section 5 in 
the bait-and-switch zone. The FTC defines “bait” as 
                                                 
40 As do statutory regimes—e.g., the UCC also protects buyers through implied war-
ranties among other mechanisms. See U.C.C. §§ 2-314, 2-315, 2-714. 
41 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 159, 162, 164, 167 (1981); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 526, 530 (1977). 
42 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981); see also U.C.C. § 2-302 (1977). 
43 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 153 (1981). 
44 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006). 
45 15 U.S.C. § 57A. 
46 15 U.S.C. § 45(b). 
47 Guides are promulgated to help advertisers understand how the FTC interprets the 
law, but they are not binding. To prosecute a case, the FTC must bring the action under 
section 5 of the FTC Act. See 16 C.F.R. §§ 1.5, 1.8 (2012); A Brief Overview of the 
Federal Trade Commission’s Investigative and Law Enforcement Authority, FED. TRADE 
COMMISSION (July 2008), http://www.ftc.gov/ogc/brfovrvw.shtm. 
48 See infra Part III for examples. 
49 For an exhaustive resource about state laws in the area of “baby FTC Acts,” see 
generally UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES (Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr., 
Consumer Credit & Sales Legal Practice Series, 6th ed. 2004). 
50 Compare 16 C.F.R. § 238 (2012) with CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17500 (West 
2012), N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 396.1 (McKinney 2012), and TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. 
§ 17.46(b)(9)–(10) (West 2012). 
51 16 C.F.R. § 238. 
2013] EXPLAINING “BAIT-AND-SWITCH” REGULATION 585 
an alluring but insincere offer to sell a product or service which the 
advertiser in truth does not intend or want to sell. Its purpose is to switch 
consumers from buying the advertised merchandise, in order to sell 
something else, usually at a higher price or on a basis more advantageous 
to the advertiser.52 
The FTC also looks to the motive of an advertisement, defining bait as ad-
vertisements with “[t]he primary aim” of “obtain[ing] leads as to persons 
interested in” purchasing other merchandise.53 
The Guides also focus on the intent and character of the initial impres-
sion that the offer leaves on the consumer. An advertised offer should not 
be published if it does not represent “a bona fide effort to sell the adver-
tised product.”54 Further, “[n]o statement or illustration should be used in 
any advertisement which creates a false impression” about attributes of the 
offering, where revelation of the truth about the product would switch the 
buyer from the featured offering to a different one.55 Subsequent disclo-
sure of the truth to the consumer would not present a defense to the FTC 
“if the first contact or interview is secured by deception.”56 The FTC also 
singles out certain behaviors that could constitute a violation of section 5, 
notably “discouragement of purchase of [the] advertised merchandise”57 
and post-sale switches.58 All of these together comprise current bait-and-
switch regulation at the federal level.59 
Though this FTC definition may seem like a straightforward, welfare-
enhancing attempt to combat deception, the economics of bait and switch 
are a bit more complex. Next, I attempt to describe the welfare dynamics 
of the FTC’s approach. 
B. Bait-and-Switch Economics 
Before assessing the scant literature about the welfare impact of the 
FTC’s brand of bait-and-switch regulation, it is worth revisiting this regu-
lation in the context of the FTC’s broader institutional purpose. The FTC 
declares a mission “[t]o prevent business practices that are anticompetitive 
or deceptive or unfair to consumers; to enhance informed consumer choice 
                                                 
52 16 C.F.R. § 238.0. 
53 Id. 
54 16 C.F.R. § 238.1. 
55 16 C.F.R. § 238.2(a). 
56 See 16 C.F.R. § 238.2(b). 
57 See 16 C.F.R. § 238.3. 
58 See 16 C.F.R. § 238.4. 
59 As noted infra Part III.A.4, retail-grocer bait-and-switch regulation differs somewhat. 
See Retail Food Store Advertising and Marketing Practices, 16 C.F.R. § 424 (2012). 
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and public understanding of the competitive process; and to accomplish 
this without unduly burdening legitimate business activity.”60 In sum, the 
FTC wishes to elevate the level of business practices without unnecessari-
ly slowing commerce. 
The FTC’s vision focuses more tightly on its role in promoting welfare 
advancement and the interests of consumers. The FTC envisions “[a] U.S. 
economy characterized by vigorous competition among producers and con-
sumer access to accurate information, yielding high-quality products at low 
prices and encouraging efficiency, innovation, and consumer choice.”61 
In the traditional case of bait and switch, where a buyer is switched 
through any sort of insincere tactic, it is entirely consistent with the mission 
of the FTC to deem these practices deceptive. But does bait-and-switch reg-
ulation advance welfare? As I discuss, formal economic studies of bait-and-
switch laws are few. But in order to divine the source of bait-and-switch 
regulation in different contexts and account for the impact of regulation, 
this welfare impact question should be answered to the extent possible. 
In order to set the stage for understanding the effect of traditional bait-
and-switch regulation, it is helpful to compare two hypothetical, simple il-
lustrations to contextualize the literature. 
1. Illustration A: Traditional Bait and Switch 
Assume that Alpha Autos, a used-car dealership, draws Consumer A to 
the Alpha lot with an “alluring but insincere” advertisement depicting a blue 
1996 Nissan Sentra for sale at the bargain price of $3000. Upon Consumer 
A’s arrival on the premises and two hours of negotiation, Alpha Autos pulls 
a “switch” and instead sells the consumer a higher profit-margin car, a 1994 
Dodge Colt for $5000. Also assume that the dealer disparaged the blue Nis-
san Sentra once the consumer was on the lot, or simply assume that the 
dealer never intended to sell the Sentra to anyone. 
In this example, Alpha Autos has employed an unfair and deceptive 
practice that the FTC has been charged with stamping out. The hypothetical 
dealer has certainly violated the bait-and-switch guidelines. The bait was 
“alluring but insincere,” the dealer “[did] not intend ... to sell” the Sentra, 
and used the Sentra offer for purposes of “sell[ing] something else.”62 In 
                                                 
60 About the Federal Trade Commission, supra note 9. 
61 Id. 
62 See 16 C.F.R. § 238.0 (“Bait advertising is an alluring but insincere offer to sell a product 
or service which the advertiser in truth does not intend or want to sell. Its purpose is to switch 
consumers from buying the advertised merchandise, in order to sell something else, usually at a 
higher price or on a basis more advantageous to the advertiser.” (emphasis added)). 
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this case, the auto dealer put Consumer A in the psychological position of 
absorbing “sunk costs.”63 Sunk cost incurrence generates a fallacy—an irra-
tional “tendency to continue an endeavor once an investment in money, ef-
fort, or time has been made.”64 One study concludes that this phenomenon 
is rooted in the “maladaptive ... desire [of people] not to appear wasteful.”65 
The sunk-cost fallacy has been used to explain routine behavior (for exam-
ple, why people will continue to watch bad movies until the closing credits) 
and more spectacular behavior (for example, why the United States contin-
ued to remain engaged in the Vietnam Conflict).66 Sunk costs should not 
bear on instant choices, but they do. They are irrecoverable.67 
In this Alpha Autos illustration, Consumer A “feels” the sunk costs of 
traveling to Alpha Autos and putting time into negotiation. Consumer A 
may also feel a disproportionate obligation to reciprocate68 and reward a 
salesperson who put time into serving and educating him. The consumer is 
not imprisoned on site, but the dealer has some control over the consum-
er’s physical presence and attention. Additionally, time constraints may 
edge Consumer A to transact rather than continue car shopping elsewhere. 
Time, the ultimate scarce resource, may constrain the consumer’s choices, 
if the consumer has urgency to transact. 
Eradication of this marketplace behavior might advance social welfare. 
Consumer A purchased the Dodge Colt for $5000. Entering the dealership, 
Consumer A expected to purchase the Nissan Sentra for $3000. The seller 
used tactics that put a thumb on the scale, leading Consumer A to complete 
a transaction that might not have been made without the weight of the sunk 
cost fallacy. If Consumer A would not have made the Dodge Colt transac-
tion without Alpha’s deceptive approach, this transaction may have led to a 
misallocation of resources and welfare. If Consumer A wises up to the trick 
later, he may experience more post-transaction disappointment. One can see 
how this bait and switch could reduce utility for the consumer.69 
                                                 
63 See generally Hal R. Arkes & Catherine Blumer, The Psychology of Sunk Cost, 35 
ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESS 124, 124–25 (1985). 
64 Id. at 124. 
65 Id. at 125. 
66 Id. at 126. 
67 Id. at 125–26. 
68 This obligation, rooted in the “reciprocity norm,” might attach in any complex sales 
scenario. The reciprocity norm reflects the human tendency to return favors, but this 
tendency can be easily exploited in the context of consumer transactions. For a general 
discussion of the reciprocity norm, see Jerry M. Burger et al., The Norm of Reciprocity as 
an Internalized Social Norm: Returning Favors Even When No One Finds Out, 4 SOC. 
INFLUENCE 11, 11–12 (2009); Alvin W. Gouldner, The Norm of Reciprocity: A Preliminary 
Statement, 25 AM. SOC. REV. 161, 161–62 (1960). 
69 See generally Ulen, supra note 37, at 793–94. 
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2. Illustration B: No Bait and Switch 
Next, assume that Consumer B, a virtual clone of Consumer A in pref-
erences, approaches Beta Motors, a used-car dealer competing directly 
with Alpha Auto. Beta maintains a similar inventory to Alpha. Beta Mo-
tors advertises a blue 1996 Nissan Sentra for sale at $3000, just as in the 
Alpha scenario. 
Consumer B walks into the dealership ready to buy the Sentra, only to 
learn from the salesperson that the Sentra had been sold earlier that morn-
ing. Apologizing for any disappointment, the salesperson asks Consumer 
B if she has interest in the Dodge Colt that Beta Motors has on the lot for 
$5000. At the end of two hours of negotiation, Consumer B purchases the 
Colt at that price. 
Here, Beta Motors led with an “alluring but sincere” offer. The pur-
pose of having the Sentra on the lot was not to enable a “switch.” No bait-
and-switch problem emerges. Yet, the same outcome is reached. Sunk 
costs were incurred by Consumer B, but not through a sneaky practice. 
Consumer B was just unlucky—the first car was gone. Beta Motors was 
lucky, because the sold car effectively functioned as bait, even though it 
would not be classified as bait. 
At the end of their respective transactions, Consumer A and Consumer 
B might be considered at first glance to be in similar welfare positions. 
They bought the same Dodge Colt for the same price after being lured in 
by the prospect of buying the Nissan Sentra. The sunk-cost fallacy works 
in the dealer’s favor in both scenarios. The “cost of leaving”70 effectively 
creates a temporary monopoly by keeping the customer on the lots of both 
hypothetical dealerships. But this is a static and incomplete view of wel-
fare. As I delve into the literature, I will explain why a dynamic view is 
required to fully understand the welfare impact. 
3. The Welfare Impact 
Continuing with our hypothetical competing dealers, a welfare prob-
lem lies with the fact that Beta Motors would not survive long in a mar-
ketplace with Alpha as the competitor. Alpha would use the Sentra as bait 
and never sell it. Beta would sincerely offer the Sentra, sell it, and lose its 
lure when it leaves the lot. Alpha would draw more traffic with the perma-
nent “insincere” Sentra lure, all else equal. If Beta found it effective to 
                                                 
70 This cost is reflected both as a real transaction cost reflected in restarting negotiation 
from the beginning with a different dealer, and as a sunk cost. 
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draw in people with Sentras as a loss leader of sorts,71 but wanted to deal 
honestly, it would require Beta to carry more inventory and use more capi-
tal. Honesty proves more expensive—perhaps fatally expensive in the mar-
ketplace. The existing economics literature supports this conclusion. 
a.  The “Lemons” Literature 
In his Nobel Prize-winning work about “the market for ‘lemons,’” 72 
George Akerlof observes that dishonest practices, if left intact, tend to prevail 
over honest practices.73 In the bait-and-switch circumstance, the seller that dan-
gles the insincere bait effectively prevails over the seller that plays honestly. 
Consider a market in which goods are sold honestly or dishonestly .... 
There may be potential buyers of good quality products and there may 
be potential sellers of such products in the appropriate price range; 
however, the presence of people who wish to pawn bad wares as good 
wares tends to drive out the legitimate business. The cost of dishonesty, 
therefore, lies not only in the amount by which the purchaser is cheat-
ed; the cost also must include the loss incurred from driving legitimate 
business out of existence.74 
In this instance, we would consider the presence of people who wish to 
use bait as equivalent to those pawning “bad wares.” Those who pawn bad 
wares with impunity will either drive other legitimate businesses to behave 
badly in a “race to the bottom,” as game theory and the “prisoner’s di-
lemma” might predict,75 or simply eliminate them from the market.76 If 
one accepts that Akerlof’s dynamic would be at work in the absence of 
regulation, bait-and-switch regulation should advance welfare. 
If the tactic employed by Alpha Autos succeeds and pervades in the 
marketplace, consumers could also prove more wary in the long term, as 
they absorb initial offerings and then transact. Consumers might enter the 
marketplace with a defensive posture, not willing to pay as much for items 
due to suspicions about deceit. Akerlof’s work on “lemons” might provide a 
                                                 
71 This is a “sincere” mechanism for driving customer traffic to the dealer. 
72 George A. Akerlof, The Market for ‘Lemons’: Qualitative Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 488 (1970). Akerlof was awarded a Nobel Prize in 
Economics for this work. See Jon E. Hilsenrath, Three Americans Win Nobel for Economics, 
WALL ST. J., Oct. 11, 2001, at A2. 
73 See Akerlof, supra note 72, at 495. 
74 Id. 
75 See Prisoner’s Dilemma, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Oct. 22, 2007), http://plato
.stanford.edu/entries/prisoner-dilemma/. 
76 The FTC’s stated goal to prevent anticompetitive behavior would be served by pre-
venting this race to the bottom. See About the Federal Trade Commission, supra note 9. 
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basis for understanding these welfare effects, too. As Akerlof noted, infor-
mation asymmetry leads to market failures.77 A seller of a used car, for ex-
ample, knows more about the car’s attributes than the buyer. The buyer 
might not be willing to pay the price that the seller thinks the car is worth 
because the buyer has less information, making the transaction more risky.78 
This leads to a market failure. A marketplace that rewards deceit is a mar-
ketplace where distrust raises transaction costs and counterparty risk, and 
welfare does not advance.79 
b. The Marketing Economics Literature 
Would Alpha Autos’ practices instantly or ultimately reduce consumer 
welfare? The limited research on the topic80 is more controversial than one 
might anticipate. Eitan Gerstner and James Hess provoked a debate with 
another set of economists on this question in the 1990s by contending that 
traditional bait-and-switch practices could potentially benefit consumers.81 
Other analysis and evidence indicates otherwise.82 But the Gerstner and 
Hess analysis provides a starting point for understanding the welfare impact. 
In 1990, Gerstner and Hess argued that that the FTC’s viewpoint on 
bait and switch was “myopic.”83 They noted that the FTC’s approach did 
not account for the competitive dynamic that could follow from bait and 
switch, notably, downward pressure on prices from aggressive sales pro-
motions.84 Gerstner and Hess also maintained that traditional regulation of 
bait and switch ignored the ultimate reputational impact bait and switch 
had on sellers; that is, the notion that repeated deployment of abusive sales 
practices would destroy a seller’s reputation and prove unsustainable.85 
Further, they argued that sales of “featured items” led to inventory stock 
outs that were already anticipated by the consumer, but at the same time 
                                                 
77 See Akerlof, supra note 72, at 490. 
78 Id. at 489–90. 
79 Akerlof illustrates this by describing the dysfunction of credit markets in India circa 
1970. Id. at 497–99. 
80 The core research in the legal and social science literature is scarce, but in intellec-
tual property, initial interest confusion is often discussed in the context of bait and switch. 
See, e.g., Rebecca Tushnet, Running the Gamut from A to B: Federal Trademark and 
False Advertising Law, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1305, 1354–55 (2011). 
81 See the first study, Gerstner & Hess I, supra note 5, at 121; then see Wilkie et al. I, 
supra note 5, at 273–74; and in reply see Hess & Gerstner II, supra note 5, at 283; and in 
further reply see Wilkie et al. II, supra note 5, at 290. 
82 Wilkie et al. I, supra note 5, at 274. 
83 Gerstner & Hess I, supra note 5, at 115. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
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stimulated welfare-advancing sales of complementary products at loss-
leader pricing.86 Gerstner and Hess further elaborated that: 
[T]he process of bait and switch can enhance economic efficiency .... 
Competition to attract customers motivates retailers to cut the prices of 
featured brands to very low levels .... [T]hese [tactics] motivate in-store 
promotions that add real utility. Stores must guard against overdoing it 
when customers foresee stock outs. They cannot take full advantage of 
the monopoly power over customers already at the store because they 
are committed to a low price for the featured brand ....87 
These assumptions about competition presume, however, that the markets 
function efficiently. In certain low-income market zones, they might not. As I 
discuss in Part III, reputation and competition may not alleviate the deception 
where consumers lack meaningful retail choices—especially in lower-income 
neighborhoods, or certain sectors like retail grocery.88 But the conjecture that 
aggressive sales tactics might benefit the consumer through loss leadership 
might carry some weight. Could a sleazy car dealership lose reputation and 
lose business to an ethical car dealership? Akerlof’s work predicts the oppo-
site result—that the unethical dealership model would prevail. 
In 1998, the journal Marketing Science published a rejoinder to the 
1990 Gerstner and Hess article.89 Wilkie et al. extended the Gerstner and 
Hess model, challenged its underlying assumptions, and concluded that 
bait and switch should remain prohibited.90 Wilkie’s key critique was that 
the “planned fraud and deceit” at the core of bait-and-switch practices 
were absent from and needed to be included in the analysis.91 In the re-
joinder, these authors drew upon the facts of an enforcement action92 to 
surface several observations about bait and switch that were ignored in the 
previous paper: 
 “Actions are coordinated and practiced, relying on gaining 
sales through deception.”93 
                                                 
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 122. 
88 See infra Part III.A. 
89 Richard Staelin, Editorial: A Discussion of Bait and Switch, 17 MARKETING SCI. 271, 
271 (1998). Publishing such rejoinders and replies was unprecedented for the journal, but 
the editor agreed to publish the piece because the issue was “very important (i.e., could alter 
the field, conclusions are major, etc.).” Id. 
90 Wilkie et al. I, supra note 5, at 273. 
91 Id. at 280. 
92 In re New Rapids Carpet Ctr., Inc., 90 F.T.C. 64, 64, 75–76, 93–96 (1977). 
93 Wilkie et al. I, supra note 5, at 274. 
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 “Huge increases in actual prices paid by bait-and-switch 
victims are common ... [and could potentially range] from 
double to nine times the price featured in the bait ad.”94 
 “Customers are often poor, uneducated and susceptible to 
‘hard-sell’ techniques.”95 
 “[P]ost-sale actions of bait-and-switch sellers often reveal a 
contempt for their customers ... includ[ing] refusals to honor 
warranties ... [and other post-sale promises] ....”96 
In the analysis of actual traditional bait-and-switch cases infra Part III, I 
find similar practices. Further, Wilkie et al. note that bait and switch ex-
ploits marketplace imperfections and that the assumption of perfect com-
petition in these markets “belies ... reality.”97 Under the Wilkie view, tradi-
tional bait-and-switch regulation would certainly advance welfare. 
Hess and Gerstner then answered this sharp rejoinder, reiterating and 
amplifying their original conclusion. They summarize: 
In every condition in which a law “might” protect customers from bait and 
switch, market competition alone forces retailers to drop the practice as 
unprofitable, so the law is moot. In every condition in which the practice of 
bait and switch creates social value, market competition always transfers 
the value to the customers, so a law prohibiting the practice actually 
damages consumer welfare .... In a competitive market when stock outs 
and upselling occur, they create welfare gains; when they would create 
welfare losses, [stock outs and upselling] do not occur.98 
Wilkie et al. wrote a final response, emphasizing that all of the original 
modeling had focused on the impact of unavailability, ignoring scenarios 
where the bait and switch involved deliberate, naked deception.99 This ex-
change reflects the entirety of the marketing economics literature on the 
subject, but when combined with Akerlof’s contribution to understanding 
markets and information asymmetry, it does seem that regulation of bait-
and-switch practices would advance welfare. 
The examples of traditional bait and switch that I explore more fully in-
fra Part III.A demonstrate how the practice can create consumer injury. 
Questions remain about why certain bait-and-switch practices are regulated 
                                                 
94 Wilkie et al. I, supra note 5, at 274–75. 
95 Id. at 275. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 281. 
98 Hess & Gerstner II, supra note 5, at 284. 
99 Wilkie et al. II, supra note 5, at 293. 
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more tightly than others, but Akerlof’s observation that bad actors can bring 
down marketplace standards and ultimately drive out good actors should be 
taken seriously. 
Additionally, apart from the core welfare economics, there is still a 
question about what kind of commercial atmosphere regulators should fos-
ter. The very spirit of bait-and-switch regulation disfavors insincerity and 
tricks. Perhaps even if Gerstner and Hess were proven correct, regulators 
would still ignore that conclusion, emphasizing fairness and norms over 
welfare advancement. 
Additionally, questions are raised about what kind of transactional envi-
ronment consumers would want to experience. How should the marketplace 
“feel” or “look” to consumers? These are cultural questions, perhaps more 
so than welfare questions. Before moving to discussion of specific bait-and-
switch tactics, in Part II, I provide some context about the interplay between 
culture, customs, norms, and welfare advancement. This enables a richer 
discussion of the range of tactics in Part III, and whether norms and customs 
trump welfare, and if so, whether they should. 
II. CUSTOM, NORMS, AND WELFARE ADVANCEMENT 
Commercial environments reflect broader underlying values and culture. 
Bargaining styles, for example, vary cross-culturally and these differences are 
even visible in childhood and adolescence. A study of children from Argenti-
na, India, and the United States reveals that even at a young age, negotiating 
patterns differ dramatically.100 Practical business literature offers observations 
about bargaining cultures and values. For example, a Harvard Business Re-
view article attempted to explain the cultural roots of the Chinese approach to 
bargaining and compare it to the American approach: 
Chinese negotiators are more concerned with the means than the end, 
with the process more than the goal. The best compromises are derived 
only through the ritual back-and-forth of haggling.... While Americans 
tend to believe that the truth, as they see it, is worth arguing over and 
even getting angry about, the Chinese believe that the way is hard to find 
and so rely on haggling to settle differences.101 
Regardless of whether this observation overly generalizes, it shows an in-
stance where culture, norms, and custom matter—and they certainly matter 
                                                 
100 See Daniel Druckman et al., Cultural Differences in Bargaining Behavior: India, 
Argentina, and the United States, 20 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 413, 413 (1976). 
101 John L. Graham & N. Mark Lam, The Chinese Negotiation, 81 HARV. BUS. REV. 
82, 84–85 (2003). 
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where values need to be reinforced with rules. If bargaining customs are 
ingrained in our values, then certainly custom might guide policymaking 
about trade practice regulation. If commercial culture eschews the practices 
associated with traditional bait and switch, perhaps that rejection reflects a 
collective belief that “truth” in the bargaining process matters as much as or 
more than the outcome. Another culture’s tradition might find traditional 
bait and switch to be a natural part of the haggling ritual—the American 
cultural custom apparently finds traditional bait and switch to be repugnant. 
Custom and norms played an express role in the formation of commer-
cial law and in the development of common law standards for other com-
mercial behavior. Karl Llewellyn and the reporters who drafted the Uniform 
Commercial Code (UCC or the Code) expressed that they were aspiring to 
incorporate the best business practices and customs into the default rules 
governing sales transactions.102 Particularly among merchants, the UCC in-
corporates custom as a default standard for commercial behavior.103 
The role of custom in commerce also emerges in other jurisprudence. In 
the famous torts case, The T.J. Hooper,104 Judge Learned Hand noted that 
trade custom could inform the standard of due care, and that reasonable care 
could be apart from established custom.105 Indeed, the prevailing custom 
could merely reflect that an industry had simply fallen behind the times with 
respect to technological advances, and done so in lockstep.106 Judge Hand 
presciently warned that adopting a trailing, but prevailing, custom would 
not necessarily provide an appropriate standard and advance welfare.107 
In his revisiting of The T.J. Hooper, Richard Epstein offers a “fresh 
view” of the role of custom in guiding the law of negligence.108 He argues 
that “in [tort] cases that arise out of a consensual arrangement ... custom 
should be regarded as conclusive evidence of due care ... where consistent 
custom emerges, ... it should be followed.”109 I contend that the importance 
Epstein attaches to custom in tort110 can be transplanted into the commer-
cial, transactional zone explored here. For the purposes of this Article, how-
ever, I am less focused on Epstein’s overall conclusions about custom than I 
                                                 
102 See discussion infra Part II.A.1. 
103 See id. 
104 The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 737, 739–40 (2d Cir. 1932). 
105 Id. at 740. The court addresses custom among commercial actors, but could be gen-
eralized to include consumers. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
108 Richard A. Epstein, The Path to The T.J. Hooper: The Theory and History of Custom 
in the Law of Tort, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (1992). 
109 Id. 
110 See id. at 4, 6–11. 
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am interested in his framework that predicts when custom will emerge to 
guide formal rules.111 
Bait-and-switch regulation varies by context, and Epstein’s framework 
may provide insight into what drives the variance. It should be noted that 
Epstein expresses skepticism about the role of custom112 in guiding devel-
opment of contract law in a “new regulatory world” where custom “[might] 
be taken as evidence of the pervasive and illicit power of landlords, em-
ployers, manufacturers, or sellers of all sizes and descriptions.”113 Yet, as I 
demonstrate, custom, if defined as general expectations of market behavior, 
does explain the bait-and-switch regulatory approach, just as it expressly 
does within the confines of the UCC.114 
Next, in Part II.A I describe how custom intertwines with commercial 
practices, using as fodder the drafting of the UCC and also Epstein’s 
framework for assessing the role of custom in consensual commercial rela-
tionships. In Part II.B, I discuss the implications of reinforcing custom 
through formal law. Finally, Part II.C explores the relationship between en-
forcing custom and norms, and advancement of efficiency and welfare. 
A. Custom and Commercial Practices 
As a custom, bait-and-switch tactics have been long regarded as a 
scourge in the commercial marketplace. Ralph Rohner and Fred Miller aptly 
describe bait and switch as aiming to subvert an “ancient but dishonorable 
practice.”115 This observation raises a question. If the practice is ancient, is 
the practice a custom? Or is the notion that it is “dishonorable” the custom? 
I would contend that the custom is reflected more completely in the “dis-
honorable” description. Theft is also ancient practice, but the taboo and dis-
honor of theft is as old as the underlying practice. 
As I discuss in Part II.A.1, the drafters of the UCC embraced cus-
tom.116 For example, custom in the form of “usage of the trade” has been 
incorporated into the Code and provides standards for behavior for trans-
actions between both merchants in a trade, and merchants and non-
merchants.117 The Code drafters’ hidden agenda to embrace customs that 
                                                 
111 See id. at 11–16. 
112 “[T]he role of custom is at best obscure.” Id. at 8. 
113 Id. 
114 See infra Part II.A.1. 
115 RALPH J. ROHNER & FRED H. MILLER, TRUTH IN LENDING 752 (Robert A. Cook et 
al. eds., 2000). 
116 See infra Part II.A.1. 
117 Id. 
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would elevate standards, rather than just formally capture them, resembles 
the agenda of bait-and-switch regulators. As I discuss in Part II.A.2, in 
certain parts of the commercial environment, the asymmetry of transacting 
parties creates conditions unfavorable for the natural emergence of a stable 
custom, as Epstein would predict.118 Regulators overlay a rule when stable 
custom fails to emerge. 
1. The Uniform Commercial Code 
Article 2 of the UCC results from efforts by the American Law Institute 
to harness and embrace custom or “usage of trade” and practices among 
merchants into a uniform law that would promote expansion of commercial 
activity through application of evolving commercial standards.119 As Lisa 
Bernstein writes, the UCC was premised on urging courts to discern the 
“immanent business norms.”120 
The Code wastes no time in declaring its underlying aims, which are 
tightly tied to providing custom-based default rules for commercial relation-
ships. UCC section 1-103, which covers “[c]onstruction of [the Code] to 
[p]romote its [p]urposes and [p]olicies,” guides that “[the Code] must be lib-
erally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies, 
[among] which are ... to permit the continued expansion of commercial prac-
tices through custom, usage, and agreement of the parties ....”121 The Code 
even defines “agreement” as “the bargain of the parties in fact, as found in 
their language or inferred from other circumstances, including course of per-
formance, course of dealing, or usage of trade ....”122 
“Usage of trade” is also defined in the Code and presents a more inclu-
sive and current view of custom than the old English common law, that is, 
holding that more recently created custom, rather than ancient custom could 
                                                 
118 See infra Part II.A.2. 
119 See U.C.C. § 1-103 cmt. 1 (2012). The Code “is drawn to provide flexibility so 
that, since it is intended to be a semi-permanent and infrequently-amended piece of 
legislation, it will provide its own machinery for expansion of commercial practices.” Id. 
The structure of the Code should enable the law “to be applied by the courts in the light 
of unforeseen and new circumstances and practices.” Id. 
120 Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s Search 
for Immanent Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1766 (1996) [hereinafter Bernstein, Merchant 
Law]. Bernstein challenges this “fundamental premise of the ... Code’s adjudicative phil-
osophy,” noting that the drafters did not anticipate how incorporating norms could “alter 
the very reality they sought to reflect.” Id. at 1766, 1769. 
121 U.C.C. § 1-103(a)(2) (2012). The other purposes are “(1) to simplify, clarify, and 
modernize the law governing commercial transactions; ... and (3) to make uniform the 
law among the various jurisdictions.” § 1-103(a)(1), § 1-103(a)(3). 
122 U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(3); see Bernstein, Merchant Law, supra note 120, at 1768. 
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provide the standard.123 UCC section 1-303(c) defines “usage of trade [as] 
any practice or method of dealing having such regularity of observance in a 
place, vocation, or trade as to justify an expectation that it will be observed 
with respect to the transaction in question.”124 The Official Comments fur-
ther elaborate on the definition and emphasize that the Code presents a for-
mal break from the old English common law,125 including a willingness to 
embrace merchant-created custom: 
A usage of trade ... must have the “regularity of observance” specified. 
The ancient English tests for “custom” are abandoned in this connection. 
Therefore, it is not required that a usage of trade be “ancient or imme-
morial,” “universal,” or the like.... [F]ull recognition is thus available for 
new usages and for usages currently observed by the great majority of de-
cent dealers, even though dissidents ready to cut corners do not agree.126 
Key sections of Article 2127 and the Official Comments128 are laden with 
examples of the incorporation of commercial norms, as are the contempo-
raneous writings of Karl Llewellyn,129 the principal drafter of the Code.130 
Llewellyn, in offering a critique of the Code’s predecessor, the Uniform Sales 
Act, noted “the amazing degree to which [the Uniform Sales Act] has failed 
                                                 
123 For a summary of the old English law, see 12 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON 
CONTRACTS § 34:12 (Supp. 2012). 
124 U.C.C. § 1-303(c). 
125  Though I am primarily concerned with the formal codification that embraces 
custom, note that modern common law, reflected in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 222 (1981) (“Usage of Trade”), also departs from the old common law 
rules requiring custom and usage of trade to have more established rooting. As § 222 
comment b clarifies: “A usage of trade need not be ‘ancient or immemorial,’ ‘universal,’ 
or the like. Unless agreed to in fact, it must be reasonable, but commercial acceptance by 
regular observance makes out a prima facie case that a usage of trade is reasonable.” Id. 
at cmt. b. The common law is also “modernizing” custom by drawing upon more recent 
and local evidence to define it. 
126 U.C.C. § 1-303 cmt. 4. 
127 See Bernstein, Merchant Law, supra note 120, at 1766 n.2. For example, the 
sections on implied warranties invoke trade standards. See U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(a) (“Goods 
to be merchantable must ... pass without objection in the trade under the contract 
description ....”); U.C.C. § 2-314(3) (“[I]mplied warranties may arise from course of 
dealing or usage of trade.”). The section on adequate assurances of performance does as 
well. See U.C.C. § 2-609(2) (“Between merchants the reasonableness of grounds for 
insecurity and the adequacy of any assurance offered shall be determined according to 
commercial standards.”). 
128 See Bernstein, Merchant Law, supra note 120, at 1766 n.3 (citing several examples). 
129 See id. at 1768 n.6, for examples of Llewellyn’s expressed point of view on the role 
of custom. 
130 Id. at 1768. 
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to reflect either commercial understanding or commercial need ....”131 This 
foreshadowed the custom-based approach he and the other drafters would 
later incorporate in the Code.132 The drafting of Article 2 of the UCC pro-
vides a primary illustration of the controversy of reinforcing custom.133 
In framing the newly crafted code for merchants, Llewellyn explained 
that the Code was 
not something new in the law .... [T]his is ... a bringing into clarity and 
explicit focus of a thing which is really there and which has been in the 
law of sales for something more than a hundred years .... The merchant 
appears in the present law without raising his head and letting it be 
known that he is there.134 
A closer look reveals that Llewellyn’s assertion may not have reflected the 
whole truth. In examining the “merchant rules,” Ingrid Hillinger concludes 
that Llewellyn “invented” them.135 Hillinger cites Llewellyn’s expressed 
drafting principle that “[s]impler, clearer, and better adjusted rules, built to 
make sense and to protect good faith, make for more foreseeable and more 
satisfactory results both in court and out,”136 and his “passionate desire to 
make ‘commercial law and practice clear, sane, and safe.’”137 Llewellyn’s 
expressive embrace of custom echoes throughout commercial regulation. 
Commercial regulation often applies custom and then stretches it for the same 
ends—clarity, sanity, and safety. This approach may or may not advance 
welfare, but it will create different atmospherics for market participants. 
2. Custom and Commercial Negligence 
From a different angle, torts jurisprudence can further illuminate the 
relationship between custom and commercial regulation. The enduring138 
                                                 
131 Karl N. Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality, and Society: II, 37 COLUM. L. REV. 
341, 389 n.124 (1937). 
132 Bernstein, Merchant Law, supra note 120, at 1768 n.6. 
133 See Ingrid Michelsen Hillinger, The Article 2 Merchant Rules: Karl Llewellyn’s Attempt 
to Achieve the Good, the True, the Beautiful in Commercial Law, 73 GEO. L.J. 1141, 1144–45 
nn.16–18 (1985); see also Robert Cooter, Normative Failure Theory of Law, 82 CORNELL 
L. REV. 947, 948 (1997). 
134 1 STATE OF NEW YORK LAW REVISION COMMITTEE REPORT, HEARINGS ON THE 
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 165 (1954) (emphasis added) [hereinafter N.Y. LAW 
REVISION REPORT]; see Hillinger, supra note 133, at 1141–42 n.4. 
135 Hillinger, supra note 133, at 1146. 
136 See id. at 1147; Karl N. Llewellyn, The Modern Approach to Counselling and 
Advocacy—Especially in Commercial Transactions, 46 COLUM. L. REV. 167, 178 (1946). 
137 See Hillinger, supra note 133, at 1146–47; N.Y. LAW REVISION REPORT, supra 
note 134, at 112. 
138 “[T]he issue [in The T.J. Hooper] has arisen in thousands of tort cases ....” Epstein, 
supra note 108, at 4. 
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The T.J. Hooper139 case demonstrates the special role of commercial cus-
tom in tort law. The case inspired Richard Epstein to offer a framework 
for identifying scenarios where custom should effectively emerge as a 
guiding standard for consensual commercial behavior.140 “Virtually none 
of the case law on custom is directed to weak customs. The key question, 
then, is: What are the determinants for a customary practice to develop 
within a consensual situation?”141 Epstein sets out to identify them, and I 
set out to apply them to broader bait-and-switch scenarios. 
Epstein first divides the commercial landscape into situations where 
the roles of the parties are either symmetrical or asymmetrical.142 Where 
the roles of parties are symmetrical, custom more easily emerges to serve 
as the rule, as the parties emerge from the same point of view and benefit 
from custom.143 This dynamic is evident in the relationships between mer-
chants that Llewellyn identified. The narrower and more symmetrical or 
identical the roles, the more likely it is that natural custom will emerge as 
a rule generator.144 Cotton and diamond merchants, for example, have 
been found to operate under a well-established set of formalistic rules 
unique to their industries.145 
Where the parties lack symmetry, there is less common ground of cus-
tom. Custom is less likely to emerge to provide the ultimate rule because it 
would be the imposition of one party’s custom onto the other. Epstein posits 
that in this asymmetric zone, the frequency of the interaction of the parties 
                                                 
139 In The T.J. Hooper, the court found that custom did not necessarily set the standard 
of care and that certain precautions must be taken to avoid negligence liability regardless of 
prevailing practices. 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932). In this case, the practices at issue 
involved the carrying of radio sets on tugboats. Id. at 737. Judge Learned Hand held: 
[I]n most cases reasonable prudence is in fact common prudence; but 
strictly it is never its measure; a whole calling may have unduly lagged in 
the adoption of new and available devices. It never may set its own tests, 
however persuasive be its usages. Courts must in the end say what is 
required; there are precautions so imperative that even their universal 
disregard will not excuse their omission.  
Id. at 740. 
140 Epstein, supra note 108, at 4. 
141 Id. at 11. 
142 Id. at 11–13. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. at 11–12. 
145 See Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating 
Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724, 1724 
(2001); Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations 
in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 115 (1992); ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND 
SOCIAL NORMS 151 (2000). 
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and the “severity” of the stakes would influence the level of the emergence 
of custom.146 If the parties interact with high frequency for low stakes, 
custom may still forge workable natural rules.147 
In the categories of bait-and-switch practices that I examine in Part III, 
the parties are typically asymmetrical, often with a retailer-consumer rela-
tionship,148 which likely attracts some of the regulatory attention. The asym-
metric power imbalance should concern regulators. With traditional bait 
and switch, regulators focus on dominant retailers or aggressive sales rep-
resentatives making big-ticket sales to consumers.149 This would be a “low 
frequency, high severity” transactional zone. We would not expect custom 
to emerge here naturally because the seller’s interest in preserving the re-
lationship is low, hence the need for heavier paternalistic regulation. 
The carve-out exception for retail grocers within bait and switch, also dis-
cussed in Part III.A.4, typically sits in a “high-frequency, low severity” 
zone.150 Custom would be expected to emerge naturally, if consumers are fre-
er to break from a consensual relationship within this repeat-player environ-
ment.151 A weak bait-and-switch rule ultimately emerged in this sector be-
cause less formal custom is more likely to prevent bait-and-switch mischief.152 
With free offers, asymmetry should be expected because this is a mar-
keting tactic large retailers deploy. All sorts of permutations of transac-
tions along the frequency and severity dimensions can occur. As I describe 
in Part III.B, the custom and tradition of free-offer tactic is largely pre-
served by regulation, and tempered by disclosure.153 The preservation of 
the seller’s custom naturally accrues to the benefit of the seller, yielding 
an inequitable outcome that also may fail to advance welfare. 
The 2009 changes in credit card regulation discussed in Part III.C may 
have resulted from a dramatic change in underlying norms. Bank issuers 
and cardholders have asymmetric roles in the transactional relationship. 
Before 2009, whenever a credit card customer initiated a relationship with a 
bank, the bank had more subsequent ability to raise rates through aggressive 
                                                 
146 Epstein, supra note 108, at 12–13. 
147 See id. at 13. 
148 Other examples include a bank/cardholder or school/student relationship. 
149 See, e.g., infra Part III.A.1. 
150 See infra Part III.A.4. If consumers are locked into a less competitive retail grocery 
marketplace, as one might find in low-income areas, the assumptions about custom might 
differ. The zone might be “high frequency, high severity,” as the important food purchases 
are concentrated and spent among fewer sellers. 
151 See infra Part III.A.4. 
152 See infra Part III.A.4. 
153 See infra Part III.B. 
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tactics.154 This debtor-creditor relationship could be characterized as high 
frequency—and as bank tactics became more aggressive and as debt bal-
ances ballooned, increasingly high severity. The gap between expected 
custom and the regulated environment widened. This may provide a norms 
or custom-based explanation for why the law changed. Norms, mores, and 
associated customs can rise and fall quickly.155 
Law school merit scholarships, as I explore in Part III.C.2, presented a 
novel puzzle. To use the hunting metaphor of the Golden Gate student, if 
the students were participating in “fair sport,” the relationship between the 
school and student should appear to have more symmetry, and the emer-
gent custom should suffice. If that were true, no corrective regulation 
about disclosure156 or other reforms would have been needed. The students 
at Golden Gate claimed that they did not know that they were in a hunting 
game. If we accept the notion that they were in a “turkey shoot,” the rela-
tionship between student and law school was more asymmetrical—and 
could be categorized as existing in a “low-frequency, high severity” zone, 
if just examined as part of a singular transaction for a big-ticket purchase. 
The “turkey shoot” scenario would beg stronger regulation. 
Epstein’s framework for explaining where custom should be expected 
to emerge in the absence of regulation shows us that when buyers and 
sellers have asymmetric roles, there is not common custom. Imposing a 
buyer’s custom or a seller’s custom on the market, as is the case in some 
bait-and-switch circumstances, may bring the marketplace more in line 
with our cultural expectations, but may not necessarily advance welfare. 
The UCC drafting experience exemplifies one historic attempt to inte-
grate existing customs into formal rules. Karl Llewellyn and the other re-
porters tried to reinforce custom through the Code, in an attempt not just 
to make standards more certain, but also in an attempt to elevate trade 
practices.157 That may provide a helpful comparative backdrop for explor-
ing policymaking in the bait-and-switch context. 
Next, I discuss the reinforcement of custom through formal means. 
Generally, custom is more likely to emerge as a proper guide for regula-
tion under certain conditions. Choosing to base law on custom—and choos-
ing a custom—presents further challenges. 
                                                 
154 See infra Part III.C. 
155 Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 
MICH. L. REV. 338, 392 (1997). 
156 See Standard 509(e), supra note 1. 
157 Hillinger, supra note 133, at 1158. 
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B. Reinforcing Custom Through Law 
With regard to basing law on custom, Eric Posner observes that “the 
relevant normative question ... is whether government can improve on so-
cial norms in particular cases, or harness them in order to achieve desired 
policy outcomes at low cost.”158 Of course, as Posner notes, it can be chal-
lenging to identify what the norm or custom is, or to discern distinctions 
between norms and mere conventions.159 Certainly, the question of “whose” 
norm dominates may matter when the symmetry between parties that Ep-
stein requires does not exist.160 
Posner observes that “[s]cholars waver between praising custom as the 
reflection of accumulating commercial wisdom, and condemning it as a 
drag on commercial advance.”161 These wavering views can surface when 
examining bait-and-switch regulation. 
Traditional bait-and-switch regulation and free-offer regulation may re-
flect cultural and customary approaches that drag commercial advance, de-
pending on one’s perspective. The commercial wisdom seems to be that bait-
and-switch tactics run counter to our acceptable trade customs. Our customs, 
as embodied in our statutes and regulations, indicate that traditional bait-and-
switch tactics are “dishonorable,”162 and this is reinforced by the law. 
Free offers, on the other hand, are so ingrained in the commercial history of 
the English-speaking world that the tradition has been largely enshrined even 
though it may mislead consumers.163 With free offers, could custom be the 
“drag on advance” about which Learned Hand warned?164 
Finally, the CARD Act example shows us that sleepy custom can be jolt-
ed by a dramatic shift in the environment. By 2009, the previous decades’ 
prevailing customary practices (which were “severe” in Epstein’s parlance) 
were upended by a populist wave that formally adopted consumer-friendly 
                                                 
158 POSNER, SOCIAL NORMS, supra note 2, at xiii. 
159 Id. “For [some] scholars, there is an important distinction between mere conventions, 
which have no normative force, and social norms, which are sustained in part because they 
reflect attitudes about what is the right thing to do.” Id. 
160 See Epstein, supra note 108, at 11–12. 
161 POSNER, supra note 145, at 165. 
162 See ROHNER & MILLER, supra note 115, at 752. 
163 See infra Part III.B. I have previously made a case against free offers, in part by detailing 
the consumer cognitive error induced by the tactic. See generally Friedman, Free Offers, supra 
note 23. The comments received by the Federal Trade Commission in 1969 reflected strong 
arguments made mostly by advertisers and mass marketers supporting retention of the status 
quo. See infra Part III.B. 
164 The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932). 
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norms over the incumbent norms.165 The custom that was ultimately en-
shrined with credit cards reflected rapidly accumulated wisdom—this cus-
tom displaced the previous custom. The law school merit scholarship dy-
namic also potentially resembles this scenario. 
The law can also influence custom through its “expressive” function.166 
Symbolically, laws can communicate values that influence behavior beyond 
the zone where actors might be formally sanctioned for a violation.167 The 
government can reinforce a “good” norm “merely by ‘expressing’ it.”168 An-
tismoking ordinances, for example, may have played an expressive role in 
shifting smoking norms.169 Legislation may not reflect a consensus about a 
behavior at the time of its passage.170 It may reflect a bare majority or even 
something less than a majority.171 Legislation may instead reflect the mag-
nification of the position of deeply committed or powerful interest groups 
combined with a level of media interest and publicity.172 The legislation 
may reflect the composition of a lawmaking body out of step with public 
opinion or may project a consensus that turns into a norm or custom.173 
Regulation crafted through administrative procedure may be even further 
insulated and attenuated from public consensus. Richard McAdams’s thesis 
is that people prefer the esteem of others, and that norms emerge as people 
pursue this esteem.174 Creating a law enhances the notion that there is a 
norm or custom to pursue that will maximize esteem.175 
That said, this expressive function of the law that embodies and ex-
presses norm and custom only has a positive effect on welfare if the norm 
or custom is the “correct” one. As noted, law can reinforce customs that 
reflect the past, putting the brakes on advancement.176 The law can also 
reinforce controversial norms or customs. The debate about marijuana le-
galization can be largely viewed through this prism. Would the decrimi-
nalization of marijuana telegraph a new norm or new custom? Would it 
increase recreational usage? Those that oppose legalization efforts argue 
that decriminalization would reset the express cultural taboo and reduce the 
                                                 
165 See infra Part III.C.1. 
166 McAdams, supra note 155, at 391, 397–408. 
167 Id. at 391. 
168 Id. at 397–98. 
169 Id. at 404–07. 
170 Id. at 403. 
171 See McAdams, supra note 155, at 401. 
172 Id. at 402–03. 
173 Id. 
174 Id. at 355–65. 
175 Id. at 397–407. 
176 See supra Part II. 
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risk that marijuana use would lead to a loss of esteem of others.177 Mariju-
ana legalization would not merely remove the legal sanction; it would di-
minish the social sanction.178 
The legal ban on traditional bait-and-switch tactics may serve an ex-
pressive function and elevate commercial behavior. One could ponder 
about whether the law produced the custom or vice versa, but the term bait 
and switch is a powerful pejorative that describes tactics that travel be-
yond the legal definition.179 The expressive function of bait-and-switch 
regulation in credit cards may signal to banks, for example, that a mandate 
toward disclosure and transparency of terms supports a new norm for the 
industry to embrace rather than fight. The expressive function of bait-and-
switch norms in other areas may spill over and affect the ultimate outcome of 
the nature of law school merit scholarship offers. Bait-and-switch regulation 
as a concept could give license to the public to identify other commercial be-
haviors that should be taboo. 
If reinforced by commercial regulation, the economic impact of the 
law will reflect the impact of the custom. If a regulation rooted in custom 
(or notions of fairness) fails to advance welfare, the embrace of the values 
behind the custom will come at a social cost. 
C. Custom, Norms, and Efficiency 
Do naturally arising customs generate welfare? Would formal adoption 
of customs be necessarily efficient? According to Eric Posner, “the view 
that social practices and norms are efficient or adaptive in some way—is 
empirically false and methodologically sterile.”180 Steven Shavell and Louis 
Kaplow note that norms often correspond with values of fairness, not in 
                                                 
177 See, e.g., Robert L. Dupont, Why We Should Not Legalize Marijuana, Marijuana & 
Money, CNBC (Apr. 20, 2010), http://www.cnbc.com/id/36267223/Why_We_Should_Not
_Legalize_Marijuana/. 
178 Id.; see Robert MacCoun & Peter Reuter, Evaluating Alternative Cannabis Regimes, 
178 BRIT. J. OF PSYCHIATRY 123, 123–24, 126–27 (2001). MacCoun and Reuter link 
marijuana legalization to difficulties with partial legalization of other vices. Id. 
179 For an example of the FTC misusing bait-and-switch language broadly in public 
communications, see Press Release, Ticketmaster and TicketsNow Settle FTC Charges of 
Deceptive Sales Tactics, Refunds for Springsteen Concertgoers Provided; FTC Warns 
Other Ticket Resellers, Federal Trade Comm’n (Feb. 18, 2010) (“The Federal Trade 
Commission today announced it has settled charges that Ticketmaster and its affiliates used 
deceptive bait-and-switch tactics to sell event tickets to consumers.”). Note that although 
the press release uses “bait-and-switch” language, the complaint filed in the Northern 
District of Illinois does not use any bait-and-switch language. See Complaint at 13, F.T.C. 
v. Ticketmaster, LLC (N.D. Ill. 2010) (No. 10 Civ. 01093). 
180 POSNER, supra note 145, at 172. 
2013] EXPLAINING “BAIT-AND-SWITCH” REGULATION 605 
promotion of welfare, which may explain why socially attractive feelings 
about fairness can trump arguments to promote efficiency.181 They provide 
further warning for policymakers that “social norms did not arise for the 
purpose of guiding formal policy analysis.”182 
Below, I examine the regulation of commercial customs associated with 
bait-and-switch tactics. As noted, some of these regulations appear to reflect 
a collective social custom, some the sellers’ custom, some an evolving so-
cial norm. If one accepts that these regulations reflect custom, it is difficult 
to say whether they are efficient or whether they even strive for efficiency. 
Eric Posner suggests that: 
norms ... should be understood as descriptions of equilibrium behavior in 
games in which people with private information interact with each other. 
Casual analysis of these games shows that social value will not necessarily 
be maximized and that state intervention can potentially improve payoffs 
for the players. Of course, whether state intervention really will make people 
better off, rather than worse off, depends heavily on circumstances.183 
Circumstances differ across categories of bait and switch that I explore 
next. Ultimately, state intervention that corrects or reinforces norms may 
or may not lead to welfare gains. This is not a new dilemma for those ex-
amining the role and impact of regulation. 
III. ANALYZING BAIT-AND-SWITCH TYPOLOGIES 
Why do we regulate certain trade practices that resemble bait and switch 
and not others? Is the purpose to advance welfare by simply eliminating de-
ception? Or is the purpose also to halt a “race to the bottom” that would cre-
ate a shark-tank marketplace replete with “turkey shoots”? Do regulators 
simply normatively reject these practices as “dishonorable”? Do regulators 
intend to send a more general expressive message to the market about de-
ception? The common theme throughout these questions is whether custom 
                                                 
181 Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 6, at 1035. 
[W]e would expect that notions of fairness, which correspond to social 
norms, will sometimes serve as helpful proxy tools for identifying legal 
rules that raise individuals’ [welfare], but we would also predict that 
there often will be an important divergence between rules that promote 
fairness and those that advance [welfare]. When there is a divergence, 
analysts should follow welfare economics rather than fairness-based 
analysis .... 
Id. 
182 Id. 
183 POSNER, supra note 145, at 179. 
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explains the regulatory approach more than welfare advancement. Though it 
is difficult to generalize an answer, exploring the different categories of bait 
and switch can surface what drives or explains policy. 
In this Part, I examine and analyze different forms of the practice, most-
ly through case studies. In Part III.A, I examine traditional bait-and-switch 
regulation, as the FTC defines and enforces it,184 and conclude that norms 
and customs play a dominant role in driving the regulatory approach. In 
Part III.B, I discuss free offers, which lure consumers with a tempting prom-
ise in order to induce them to pay for something else, and conclude that 
the cultural norms and customs prevail over welfare concerns, leaving the 
trade practice intact. I examine credit card rate switches in Part III.C and 
compare the regulatory and legislative environment for banks with that of 
law school merit scholarships, which some might argue operate in a simi-
lar manner. In Part III.D, I briefly glimpse at other common tactics that 
walk up to the line of bait and switch, but feel consistent with custom and 
norms and are, not surprisingly, lawful. 
A. Traditional Bait and Switch 
In Part III.A, I examine tactics that fall into the unlawful category of 
bait and switch. I discuss specific examples of enforcement actions. I first 
describe a highly disfavored flavor of bait and switch—the seller’s attempt 
to switch a buyer to another offering after completing a transaction by dis-
paraging the initial purchased offering. Next, I describe a slightly less ag-
gressive, but still unlawful, flavor of bait and switch, wherein the buyer is 
lured by the bait and the seller subsequently disparages the bait. I then fo-
cus in Part III.A.3 on the scenario where the “switcher” does not disparage 
anything, but merely has no sincere intent to sell what was initially adver-
tised. Finally, in Part III.A.4, I describe the FTC’s carve-out for bait and 
switch in retail groceries and how the regulation evolved along with the 
norms and customs of the day. 
The common thread that I follow through all these specific illustrations 
of bait and switch185 is that custom tends to prevail, whether consistent 
with welfare advancement or not. Even when the language of economics is 
used, as it is in retail grocery regulation, it seems to be used strategically, 
selectively, and as a proxy for explaining the norms of the time. 
                                                 
184 Using examples referenced in JOHN A. SPANOGLE ET AL., CONSUMER LAW: CASES 
AND MATERIALS 223–28 (3d ed. 1991). 
185 I drew from prototypical case examples selected in MICHAEL M. GREENFIELD, 
CONSUMER TRANSACTIONS 75 (5th ed. 2009). 
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1. Disparagement of an Already Purchased Offering 
An extreme example of seller “insincerity” would be where the buyer 
completes a purchase, and then the seller disparages the object of the origi-
nal purchase and attempts to undo the deal in order to induce a different 
transaction more favorable to the seller. The tactics employed by the home 
improvement industry in the 1960s embraced this practice to the extreme.186 
The FTC did not merely pursue enforcement. The Commission brought the 
industry’s bait-and-switch tactics to the attention of Congress.187 
The FTC action in All-State Industries of North Carolina v. FTC188 pro-
vides a basic illustration. All-State Industries involved a seller that would 
first close contracts for aluminum siding with consumers, pitching a cheap-
er, lower grade of aluminum material.189 This cheaper grade of material 
was heavily advertised by the seller in marketing materials, with little or 
no mention of any higher grade of product.190 The sales strategy was for 
the salesperson to generate interest for the cheap product through a variety 
of gimmicks and promotions.191 
The court described the sales process as “set forth in the sales force’s 
training manual.”192 The All-State Industries salesperson would 
attempt[] to pressure the prospect into signing a contract ... committing 
him to the purchase of [the cheaper] articles but leaving blank the 
monetary obligation. As soon as the contract is executed, the salesperson 
brings out a sample of the [cheaper material] and points out deficiencies 
in it, “whether real or imaginary”. The [more expensive, premium material] 
is then shown in contrast, to the detriment of the [cheaper material.] 
Whenever possible the [premium material] is then sold “at the highest 
price obtainable from the individual customer”. The salesmen ... receive 
no commission on [cheaper articles] but only on [premium] sales.193 
This tactic is classic, traditional bait and switch. A transaction reaches fru-
ition, and under the pressure of having made a commitment to a pur-
chase,194 the customer feels compelled to switch to the “superior” product. 
                                                 
186 See Unfair Practices in the Home Improvement Industry and Amendments to the FTC 
Act: Hearings on S.J. Res. 130, S. 3065 and S. 3066 Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, 90th 
Cong. 1–2 (1968). 
187 See All-State Indus. of N.C., Inc. v. FTC, 423 F.2d 423, 424 (4th Cir. 1970). 
188 Id. at 426. 
189 Id. at 424–25. 
190 Id. at 424. 
191 Id. at 425. 
192 Id. 
193 See 423 F.2d at 424–25. 
194 The sunk-cost mindset may provide the primary pressure source. 
608 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:575 
There is no doubt that with the aluminum sales process, the initial offer 
was insincere and part of a deceptive scheme. 
From a custom perspective, this level of dishonesty offended all mar-
ketplace sensibilities. This sales process expressly builds on deception and 
outright lying. These aluminum-siding tactics could be described as leg-
endarily outrageous,195 and unfair to consumers and any honest competitors. 
The restoration of the norm through regulation and enforcement may 
align with the result best suited to advancing welfare. The aluminum sid-
ing case provides an illustration where consumer cognition may be distort-
ed at the time of the switch. The consumer is invested in the transaction 
and may be malleable enough to agree to buy a product that they did not 
need at a price that they might not have entertained without the tactic. The 
key here is that the consumer has reached a commitment level with the 
salesperson—and probably a connection of trust—that destroys the ability 
to make a rational, welfare-advancing deal. 
Epstein’s framework implies that custom in this particular market en-
vironment would not provide an efficient result. The seller (a large mar-
keting organization with a detailed tactical sales strategy) and the home-
owner are positioned asymmetrically in this transaction. The sale involves 
a one-time transaction and a large-ticket item: a “low frequency,” “high 
severity” zone. Legal sanction may be required where nonlegal sanctions 
would fail. Here, imposing a legal structure serves an expressive function 
to discourage poor market behavior, a welfare-advancement function, and 
the purpose of reinforcing a strong social norm. 
2. Disparagement of Bait 
The classic bait-and-switch scenario begins with the seller’s disparage-
ment of the initial advertised offering (the “bait”), and results in a switch to 
a transaction that works to the seller’s favor. Direct, express disparagement 
of an advertised item would certainly provide a basis for proving that the 
initial offer was “insincere,”196 running against acceptable customary mar-
ketplace behavior. However, express disparagement is not a requirement. A 
deliberate effort to switch the sale by simply contrasting the initial offering 
with a superior offering can suffice to constitute unlawful deception.197 
                                                 
195 In fact, if one were to make a movie about bait-and-switch practices and their 
regulation, this would be the industry. See TIN MEN (Touchstone Pictures 1987) (illustrating 
the sales practices described in the All-State Industries case and accompanying efforts to 
curb them). 
196 See 16 C.F.R. § 238.0 (2012). 
197 16 C.F.R. § 238.4. 
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Southern States Distributing Company198 involved a seller of big-ticket 
household improvement items like carpeting, siding, and swimming pools.199 
Southern States promoted less expensive items through advertisements, 
but instructed the sales representatives, who personally visited homes, to 
present premium versions of a product alongside the lower-quality adver-
tised product, typically with the use of physical models.200 The premium 
items were displayed in a dramatically superior and more attractive man-
ner than the “bait” that generated the initial interest.201 The FTC ultimately 
found that 
the models ... distorted the real differences between bait items and switch 
items, to the detriment of the bait items. For instance, the deluxe pool 
model came in a black carrying case with a plexiglass cover, painted, 
landscaped, and filled with blue ersatz water, while the advertised pool 
model was made of unpainted wood, contained in an unpainted wooden 
suitcase, and came without simulated water, swimming pool ladder, or 
the same sort of luxurious landscape. Similarly, inspection and compar-
ison of other models of advertised and deluxe products indicates that the 
deluxe model was invariably packaged to appear comparatively more 
attractive than it would if simply placed or installed side by side with the 
economy item in the same setting.202 
The FTC concluded that although it was difficult to discern whether 
consumers decided to switch from the advertised cheaper product to the 
more expensive one due to quality, or due to the distorted mode of presenta-
tion, “[i]t [was] clear ... that consumers were induced by display of these 
models to depart from their previous intentions to purchase the advertised 
economy product and accept the more expensive one.”203 The FTC deemed 
these “embellishments” misleading.204 
The practices described in Southern States might appear a degree less 
oppressive than the All-State Industries example above. Consumer cogni-
tive error is still being induced, but perhaps the sunk costs are not as deep 
as when a contract has already been signed and a transactional relationship 
has formed. Nonetheless, just as in All-State Industries, the norm against 
the bait practices was violated and the transgression was corrected by the 
FTC through formal means. The social welfare impact in a case like this 
                                                 
198 See In re S. States Distrib. Co., 83 F.T.C. 1126 (1973). 
199 Id. at 2, 8. 
200 Id. at 8–9. 
201 Id. at 10. 
202 Id. at 31 (internal citations omitted). 
203 Id. 
204 See S. States Distrib. Co., 83 F.T.C. at *32. 
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one would depend on the degree of error that the consumer might make. 
The very same welfare concerns raised in the Alpha Autos hypothetical 
scenario in Part I.B would also appear here. 
The next flavor of traditional bait and switch does not involve any ex-
press disparagement, but rather the plain use of an insincere offering to 
generate interest in a different transaction. In this next instance, the tactics 
ruled unlawful began to brush against other aggressive, but lawful, retail 
marketing tactics. Unlike the previous two illustrations, in a case where 
tactics are not as explicit, the FTC must rely more upon the actual out-
comes of the marketing tactics rather than the mechanics per se. 
3. Bait and Switch Without Disparagement 
The FTC can question sincerity of the initial offer even without any 
measure of disparagement of the initial offer.205 If the larger picture shows 
that the initial offer is insincere, the FTC can deem the practices of the 
seller deceptive.206 Pursuit of these less obvious cases, like the next one, 
illuminates the norms that the FTC implicitly tries to promote. Within the 
context of its time, one can see how certain social trends supported a pro-
nounced paternalistic effort to improve marketplace custom. 
In 1966, the FTC filed a complaint against Leon A. Tashof, the operator 
of New York Jewelry Company, a retail store in urban Washington, D.C.207 
Tashof, the sole proprietor, “advertis[ed], [and] offered for sale ... various ... 
goods, including ... watches, radios, rings, furniture, cookware, eyeglasses, 
television sets and other electrical appliances ....” 208  The commissioner 
found that Tashof’s customers had low incomes and relied on credit for a 
substantial amount of store purchases.209 The store’s advertising and mar-
keting tactics aggressively targeted consumers with credit difficulties.210 At 
                                                 
205 16 C.F.R. §§ 238.0–1 (2012). 
206 16 C.F.R. § 238.2. 
207 See In re Leon A. Tashof, 74 F.T.C. 1361, 1361 (1968), aff’d, 437 F.2d 707 (D.C. 
Cir. 1970). 
208 Id. at 1364. 
209 Id. 
210 Id. at 1373. The store’s practices with respect to credit appeared predatory, and 
that appearance may have informed the whole of the FTC’s decision. The store handed 
cards out on the street that read: “Because We Appreciate Your Business, Mr. Tash, the 
Mgr., Says: I’ll give credit to everybody even if you never had credit, Lost your credit, or 
others have turned you down.” Id. at 1374. The store also freely handed out “credit cards” 
that read: “Certifies that BEARER is an AAA-1 Preferred Customer; Instant Credit—No 
Money Down; Make Your Own Terms; This card certifies that you have a preferred 
credit rating and attests to your character excellence.” Id. 
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specific issue in the FTC’s complaint were the store’s practices with respect 
to the advertising and selling of eyewear and related services.211 
The store had repeatedly placed advertisements in newspapers that 
were typified by the following presentation: 
DISCOUNT EYE GLASSES MADE WHILE YOU WAIT 
Price includes lenses, frames and case—from $7.50 complete212 
Radio advertising reinforced the notion that the complete package for eye-
glasses would cost $7.50: 
I’ll protect your eyes and protect your pocketbook * * * eyeglass 
service at economy prices * * * complete eyeglasses, including lenses 
and frame, for as low as $7.50 * * * .... Oculists’ prescriptions filled at 
low economy prices * * * be thrifty * * * protect your eyes and protect 
your pocketbook at the thrifty economical discount department of the 
New York Jewelry Company.213 
The FTC concluded that this advertising did not mean to communicate a 
“bona fide offer” to sell eyeglasses at a price significantly below that of 
competing retailers,214 as part of a bait-and-switch scheme.215 The store 
conditioned the offer on the purchase of an eye examination from the 
store’s oculist, or required customers to bring a prescription with them.216 
These tactics apparently generated confusion for customers because prac-
tically nobody paid $7.50 for a pair of eyeglasses on a standalone basis. 
Out of 1400 pairs of eyeglasses sold by the store from 1964 through 1966, 
ninety-nine percent were sold at prices exceeding $7.50,217 “with or with-
out an optical prescription, [and not] a single $7.50 sale was made any 
time regardless of any extra charge for an eye examination.”218 Instead, 
consumers were buying eyeglasses from the store at dramatically higher 
prices or as part of a different bundle.219 
Tashof argued that these factual findings were immaterial, arguing that 
no evidence emerged that the store “disparaged” the alleged $7.50 bait 
                                                 
211 Id. at 1364. 
212 Id. 
213 See Leon A. Tashof, 74 F.T.C. at 1374. 
214 Id at 1379. 
215 Id. at 1375–79. 
216 Id. at 1375–76. 
217 The prices often well exceeded $7.50 per pair. Seventy-two percent of glasses were 
sold at prices exceeding $39. Id. 
218 Id. 
219 See Leon A. Tashof, 74 F.T.C. at 1377. 
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eyeglasses in an attempt to switch customers to more expensive lines.220 
The FTC noted that though disparagement was indeed a frequently em-
ployed tactic to switch the consumer to a different product, it was not a 
necessary element for proving that a seller engaged in a bait and switch.221 
Bait and switch, the FTC argued, was more encompassing. What mattered 
was that “an offer [was] made which [was] not bona fide in that the seller 
[had] no intention to sell the advertised product at the advertised price but 
... [used] the advertisement as a ‘come-on.’”222 
The FTC considered other factors in ruling that the store had engaged 
in bait and switch, including the “economic feasibility” of the offering for 
the seller and the level of sales for the advertised offer.223 On its face, the 
totality of the entire scheme added up to evidence of bait and switch.224 
Custom and norms were expressly involved in this case. The hearing 
officer in the initial (now reversed) dismissal of the Tashof matter noted: 
“This case was founded upon the premise ... that the problems involved in 
the complaint required that new ground needed to be plowed in order to 
right the wrongs of a part of our economic system particularly as they af-
fect the low-income class of our society....”225 In dismissing the broad de-
ception claims, the officer noted further that Congress had been wrestling 
with legislation about these sorts of practices for some time.226 The pro-
gressive norms were evolving into formal rules at the time of the Tashof 
case, and this evolution literally entered the narrative of the case. Further, 
the ultimate conclusions reached by the FTC and enforced by the D.C. 
Circuit aspired to raise commercial standards. They took the customs 
prevalent in the broader marketplace and used them as the benchmark to 
raise the standards in this low-income market. 
Tashof effectively demonstrates the imposition of a new norm, and as 
noted in Part II, such an imposition of custom could potentially trade off 
advancements in fairness for a loss of efficiency.227 In drafting Article 2 of 
the UCC, Karl Llewellyn attempted to elevate practices by appealing to 
custom, but at the same time, believed that application of custom would 
elevate practices, rather than reinforce what was in place.228 In The T.J. 
                                                 
220 Id. at 1378. 
221 Id. 
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224 Id. at 1378–79. 
225 See Leon A. Tashof, 74 F.T.C. at 1372. 
226 Id. 
227 See supra Part II. 
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Hooper, Judge Learned Hand cautioned that reliance on custom as a com-
mercial standard could be a drag on advancement.229 Here, had the incum-
bent custom been adopted, the standard for sincerity in the marketplace would 
be much lower than adopting the retailer standards in the broader market. 
In assessing the social norms and customs of the Tashof case, a parallel ap-
pears in the well-known case about the doctrine of unconscionability that also 
emerged from the District of Columbia, Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture 
Co.230 Not only did Tashof and Williams emerge from the same city at roughly 
the same time, they emerged from the same Seventh Street neighborhood.231 
In Williams, the plaintiff had entered into a consumer installment sales 
agreement with a retailer that put her in the position of suffering a substan-
tial forfeiture for a default.232 The court recognized the validity of the un-
conscionability defense for plaintiffs situated like Williams and remanded 
the case accordingly.233 
In rejecting Williams’s claim, the lower court, the Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia, expressed a stance about the morals of the 
marketplace, but did not see fit to recognize the defense. “‘We cannot 
condemn too strongly appellee’s conduct. It raises serious questions of 
sharp practice and irresponsible business dealings.’”234 The D.C. Circuit 
repeated this concern but went on to argue that a statutory basis was not 
required to defeat the agreement.235 This norm, condemning the market-
place conduct of the retailer, would be enforced and enshrined through the 
ruling. Just as in Tashof, the emerging norm would be enforced. 
The marketplace behavior on Seventh Street in Washington, D.C., in the 
1960s appeared to involve routine employment of aggressive marketing tactics, 
                                                 
229 The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932). 
230 See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
231 The New York Jewelry Company operated at 719 Seventh Street, NW. See In re 
Leon A. Tashof, 74 F.T.C. 1361, 1361 (1968), aff’d, 437 F.2d 707 (D.C. Cir. 1970). The 
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234 Id. at 448 (citing Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 198 A.2d 914, 916 
(D.C. Ct. App. 1964)). 
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largely through the use of credit.236 Regulators and courts would attempt to 
change these dynamics through the reinforcement of new norms—norms that 
valued integrity of commercial behavior and consumer dignity for the 
economically disadvantaged over aggregate economic considerations.237 
Confusing, disingenuous tactics would no longer be endorsed. 
Williams raised the potential welfare impact of elevating standards. 
Judge Danaher, in his dissent, urged caution in deploying unconscionability 
and imposing a paternalistic norm to benefit those on “relief.”238 He implic-
itly argued that the imposition of the norm might have deleterious conse-
quences for welfare: “Many relief clients may well need credit, and certain 
business establishments will take long chances on the sale of items, expect-
ing their pricing policies will afford a degree of protection commensurate 
with the risk.”239 
In Tashof, consumers were being served by a store that catered to a 
credit-poor market segment. Perhaps, one could alternatively argue that the 
aggressive nature of the sales tactics yielded more competition on Seventh 
Street, lowering prices and broadening product availability. The FTC only 
compared the pricing of the eyeglasses sold against the prices advertised. 
But if the prices for the goods sold were below that (or competitive with) 
other sellers in the market, were consumers injured?240 Were consumers 
diverted from better alternatives? The FTC did not entertain that inquiry, 
and it appears that that argument was never formally made. The underlying 
narrative of norms and insincere behavior prevailed over any discussion of 
welfare in Tashof. Judge Danaher’s specific concerns about consumers were 
swept aside in favor of instilling norms of sincere behavior. 
Ultimately, these cases broadcasted that it was unacceptable for sellers 
to compete for business using these tactics, and that new norms needed to 
be enforced. The Tashof case, reviewed in conjunction with Williams, pre-
sents the larger debate about bait and switch. What are the norms? Should 
norms be reinforced through formal rules? What is the tradeoff, if any, be-
tween enforcing this paternalistic custom and welfare advancement? 
                                                 
236 The New York Jewelry Company engaged in aggressive credit plans, too. This was 
incorporated into the FTC’s larger complaint. See In re Leon A. Tashof, 74 F.T.C. 1361, 
1366–70 (1968), aff’d, 437 F.2d 707 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
237 See Epstein, supra note 108, at 1–2. 
238 Williams, 350 F.2d at 450 (Danaher, J., dissenting). 
239 Id. 
240 Perhaps competitors would be injured by loss of market share to the more aggressive 
marketer, but that would present a different issue. As noted supra Part I, Akerlof would 
predict that bad practices would drive out good. There may be room for competitors to seek 
remedies through the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1976), or similar state statutes 
addressing injury from false advertising, but it may be more expensive to litigate than 
simply to cooperate. 
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4. The Retail Grocery Carve-Out 
The exceptional rules for retail grocers also provide grist for understand-
ing the roles of custom and norms. At first, stricter rules were directed at the 
industry to elevate the commercial behavior, reflecting the norms of the 
day.241 Two decades later, the rules were weakened, also reflecting the 
norms of the day—but the norms had changed.242 
In the late 1960s, the FTC began to scrutinize the marketing and pric-
ing behavior of supermarkets, with a focus on low-income areas.243 Adver-
tised low-price items (specials) concerned the FTC.244 In a 1966 study, the 
FTC found that specials lowered the average price for grocery store mer-
chandise by five percent and that customers who could take “full ad-
vantage” of the promotions could reduce their grocery spending by ten 
percent.245 For aggressive, cost-conscious consumers, saving this much 
money on the food budget would be quite significant. However, the FTC 
study showed that in many cases, and certainly in the aggregate, that these 
potential savings were under-realized due to product unavailability or 
simple failure to match the in-store prices to the advertising.246 
The study of supermarkets in Washington, D.C., revealed that twenty-
three percent of advertised specials were not in stock in the low-income 
area stores, and in eleven percent of high-income locations.247 The num-
bers in San Francisco were lower in both categories, but significant none-
theless: seven percent and five percent.248 In both cities, the rate of mis-
pricing of the offer when compared with the advertisement averaged seven 
to eight percent, with three-quarters of the mispricing skewing above the 
advertised price.249 
The FTC Guides Against Bait Advertising, adopted in 1959, already re-
quired that all sellers keep adequate stock on hand to meet the demand of 
the items that they promoted.250 Industry-specific recommendations for re-
tail grocery, however, were made in the study.251 Along with suggestions 
                                                 
241 Retail Food Store Advertising and Marketing Practices, 16 C.F.R. § 424 (1971). 
242 Amendment to Trade Regulation Rule Concerning Retail Food Store Advertising 
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about price posting and modification to “raincheck” policies, the study rec-
ommended that grocery stores adopt additional controls and improve super-
vision over individual outlets.252 
To establish a sense of the role of evolving norms in formally changing 
trade practices, reading the broader context of the FTC’s Economic Report on 
Food Chain Selling proves instructive. Once again, the focus coincidentally 
returns to 1960s District of Columbia.253 The study expressed general con-
cerns about food distribution in low-income urban areas, noting that suburban 
areas did not suffer from the same problems.254 The Report noted that con-
sumers in low-income urban areas transact in retail outlets that are “small, 
less efficient, and higher[-]price[d]” that sell “lower quality merchandise[,] 
and [offer] fewer services” out of “old and ... shabby” facilities.255 
From an economic standpoint, in the District of Columbia, retail food 
store competition was highly concentrated at the time of the study, with 
the top four players holding eighty-three percent of the “inner-city” market 
share.256 In San Francisco, by comparison, the top four players controlled 
thirty-three percent of the market.257 The study partially attributes the mis-
pricing and product unavailability problems to the absence of competition.258 
This conjecture would offer an economic justification for providing a mecha-
nism to change the norms and customs and elevate the marketing behavior of 
the grocers. During this era, the antitrust division of the FTC litigated the 
problems of concentration in the retail grocery sector, and then promulgated 
industry merger guidelines.259 But this refinement to the bait-and-switch rule 
attempted to correct economic behavior on a more micro level.260 
In an attempt to elevate commercial custom, the FTC promulgated a 
rule directed toward retail food store advertising in 1971.261 The so-called 
                                                 
252 Id. at 7–8. 
253 Id. at 4. 
254 Id. at 3. 
255 Id. at 3. 
256 Id. at 4. 
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260 See, e.g., United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 273–75, 277–78 
(1966); In re Kroger Co., 74 F.T.C. 1129, 1129–31 (1968); In re National Tea Co., 69 
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available at http://www.aae.wisc.edu/fsrg/publications/Archived/wp-18.pdf. 
261 Retail Food Store Advertising and Marketing Practices, 16 C.F.R. § 424 (1971). 
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“Unavailability Rule” gave retailers rigorous administrative tasks to ensure 
that their inventory management and advertising practices passed muster.262 
The rule required that for a defense “against a charge of failure to have 
items available” the stores would need to “maintain[] records showing that 
the advertised items were timely ordered and delivered in quantities suffi-
cient to meet reasonably anticipated demand.”263 
In the two decades following the study and enactment of the new guide, 
technological advancements dramatically altered the industry’s approach 
toward inventory and labeling and pricing controls. The first Universal 
Product Code scanner was introduced in 1974.264 By the mid-1980s, half of 
the supermarkets in the United States deployed scanning systems.265 This 
technology should have made inventory management and pricing controls 
less expensive to administer. In 1986, however, another report by the FTC 
concluded that, in spite of this advancement, compliance with the 1971 Un-
availability Rule was inordinately costly and might even injure consumers 
by making grocery items more expensive.266 
Upon revising the Unavailability Rule in 1989, the FTC noted that 
“overall unavailability rates have been reduced by about 50 percent” since 
the introduction of the Rule in 1971.267 The FTC’s 1986 study revealed that 
although the technological advancements in “computerization” contributed 
to the reduction of unavailability, the measures taken to comply with the 
Rule (along with enforcement measures in the 1970s) were the primary 
drivers of the reduction.268 The FTC did not stop to pat its institutional self 
on the back for this accomplishment, however, and took a close look at the 
costs of this reduction, ultimately restructuring the rule.269 
The FTC found that food retailers had taken an extremely defensive 
posture after the 1971 Rule was promulgated. The record revealed that 
“most food retailers feel compelled to take precautions that they would 
otherwise not take in the ordinary course of business to avoid inadvertent 
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violations of the Rule.”270 The retailers took “extraordinary measures” to 
comply, “includ[ing] maintaining inventory cushions over and above what 
is needed to meet reasonably anticipated demand, performing additional 
checks of retail shelves, and creating and maintaining records of their cu-
mulative monitoring activities.”271 When assessing the net impact of the 
Rule, the FTC concluded “the costs of complying with [the] Rule greatly 
exceed[ed] the benefits.”272 The cost-to-benefit ratio of the Rule was char-
acterized by FTC staff as “overwhelming” and ranged anywhere from 
2.5:1 to almost 8:1.273 
The revised 1989 Rule afforded bait-and-switch defenses that were 
much simpler for retailers to avail themselves, but not nearly as direct as 
requiring closer recordkeeping.274 The FTC, after the 1989 Rule, would 
not effectively compel the tracking of inventory in the way that the 1971 
Rule did.275 The 1989 Rule offers looser avenues of protection for retail 
grocers attempting to comply with FTC guidelines, focusing on the stores’ 
ordering programs, raincheck policies, and willingness to discount substi-
tute goods or offer other compensation upon stocking out.276 
The 1986 report and subsequent rule change did not arrive without con-
troversy, however.277 Federal Trade Commissioner Andrew J. Strenio, Jr., 
saw no “net consumer benefit” to the rule amendment, despite the “intuitive 
appeal” of the revisions.278 On the other hand, Commissioner Terry Calvani 
argued in a short but strong dissent that the FTC should have repealed the 
entire rule. “[I]n the highly competitive grocery store business, where con-
sumers return week after week to the same store, any supermarket that frus-
trates its customers through unavailability of advertised items will not long 
keep those customers .... [E]xisting market forces adequately police una-
vailability ... therefore, no [FTC] rule is necessary ....”279 
Though the FTC did not go as far as repeal, this change did present a 
regulatory zigzag. From the 1960s through the late 1980s, regulators 
cloaked their approaches in economics from start to finish. The 1969 FTC 
study was chock full of data, as were the findings that led to the 1989 rule 
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change.280 It could be discerned that the politics driving the 1969 Rule 
promulgation were about broader social norms, and the relevant economic 
data was drawn upon to support those politics, whereas the 1989 revision 
reflected the deregulatory atmosphere of the 1980s. In the 1969 report, the 
urban challenges of the time were a paramount part of the introduction: 
Food pricing in inner-city poverty areas is a particularly critical question 
.... [G]rievances concerning unfair commercial practices were significant 
in over half of the [recently] riot-torn cities studied. The strength of this 
[retail grocery stores] grievance in Washington, D.C., poverty areas was 
revealed in a recent survey which showed that nearly nine out of every 10 
black persons interviewed complained of the poor quality and high prices 
of the food available ....281 
Once again, the commercial customs and practices of 1960s Washington, 
D.C., coincidentally emerge as an inspiration for setting new rules. The 
District of Columbia of this era could be viewed perhaps as a proxy for the 
commercial culture in the urban environment throughout the United States. 
With the support of underlying economic data, the retail grocery store rule 
was first implemented. 
Political norms also likely played a role in the FTC’s moderation of the 
rule in the late 1980s. To generalize, a deregulatory political ethos and culture 
was expressed throughout the Reagan presidency.282 Deregulation was cer-
tainly in the political air, and President Reagan’s emphasis on “paperwork 
reduction”283 certainly was, too. 
                                                 
280 The 1969 Report collected data on “the general organization of food markets in 
metropolitan areas” and “survey findings on chainstore pricing in Washington, D.C., and 
San Francisco metropolitan areas....” ECONOMIC REPORT ON FOOD CHAIN SELLING, supra 
note 33, at 13–20, 25–39. See generally Amendment to Trade Regulation Rule Concerning 
Retail Food Store Advertising and Marketing Practices, 54 Fed. Reg. 35,456 (Aug. 28, 
1989) (employing numerous private and public empirical studies). 
281 ECONOMIC REPORT ON FOOD CHAIN SELLING, supra note 33, at 1. 
282 As President Reagan wrote to Congress in the transmission of his final Annual 
Economic Report: 
While my Administration has been successful in reducing many regula-
tions and intrusions into markets, much remains to be done. We must ... 
diminish the burden of Federal regulations....With few exceptions, the pri-
vate sector is best able to allocate resources to their most highly valued 
uses, and it should be allowed to do so without excessive paperwork and 
restrictions. That is why privatization, deregulation, and private sector initi-
atives have been important elements of my economic program. I believe in 
the inherent dynamism of the private sector, and I believe that the most 
constructive thing government usually can do is simply get out of the way. 
Ronald Reagan, U.S. President, Message to the Congress Transmitting the Annual 
Economic Report of the President (Feb. 19, 1988) (emphasis added). 
283 See id. 
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The zigzag reflects that the social norms and prevailing culture drove 
the regulatory scheme. The sources of the proffered economic justification 
varied, but the evolution of the rule closely tracked the evolution of the 
political environment. 
By the 1960s, it appeared that the FTC was, in effect, making the argu-
ment that the market structure in low-income grocery retail generated asym-
metry between grocer and consumer.284 The absence of competition proved 
unfavorable for the emergence of custom, which created the need for closer 
regulation. Nonlegal sanctions from low-income consumers to correct bait-
and-switch tactics were unavailable because dominant stores left few alterna-
tives for consumers. The upper-income segment saw more competition, with 
consumers faring better on availability and pricing. Perhaps custom and non-
legal sanction for unavailability, pricing, and other areas worked because 
consumers had more choices and were more mobile. Nonetheless, the FTC 
rule needed to address the entire sector. By the late 1980s, the FTC took the 
position that competition would ultimately provide the solution, substituting 
a new set of values in place of the 1960s cultural concern. 
In sum, the desire to elevate marketplace standards provoked the FTC to 
regulate the supermarkets more tightly in the 1960s. The enthusiasm for de-
regulation possibly provoked changes in the other direction in the 1980s. 
Economics regarding the urban food market were cited to support the for-
mer change; the economics of supporting the regulation were cited to sup-
port the latter. One could surmise that the political narrative—and the norm 
of the day—may have mattered more than the economics, and if not, then at 
least as much. Norms and marketplace values trumped welfare concerns.285 
B. Free Offers 
I include “free offers” in the bait-and-switch family because in this in-
stance, the seller lures the consumer to an offering of something free—in 
order to lead them to transact for something that is not free. The consumer 
is effectively baited in and switched, albeit in a different way. Free offers 
are lawful promotions if sellers meet certain criteria, and it is telling to ex-
plore why they remain lawful while traditional bait-and-switch tactics are 
not. Here, history and custom appear to have a heavy influence on the out-
come—not advancement of welfare. 
The free offer has a long heritage and is well-established in commer-
cial culture in the United States and elsewhere.286 Since the nineteenth 
                                                 
284 See generally ECONOMIC REPORT ON FOOD CHAIN SELLING, supra note 33. 
285 One also might surmise that industry concerns weighed heavily in the 1980s shift. 
See id., Comments. 
286 See Friedman, Free Offers, supra note 23, at 52 n.20. 
2013] EXPLAINING “BAIT-AND-SWITCH” REGULATION 621 
century, free offers have been a part of the landscape.287 The prototypical 
free offer involved pubs, saloons, and grocery stores promoting free salty 
food to lure in customers in the expectation that they would buy alcoholic 
beverages.288 Nobel Laureate Milton Friedman’s famous aphorism, “[t]here’s 
no such thing as a free lunch,”289 originates from this custom of sellers of-
fering food that appeared free, but in fact was conditioned on or heavily 
promoted another purchase. 
Today, a free offer is lawful, provided that the conditions of the free of-
fer are clearly disclosed.290 As the modern approach to modern free-offer 
regulation evolved, at least one regulator noted a contradiction inherent in 
permitting a seller to call an offering free while requiring them to disclose 
that it is not—and perhaps some measure of insincerity.291 The custom that 
triumphed in this debate was the notion that caveat emptor would largely 
guide the use of the word “free.”292 Perhaps looming larger than that was 
the well-established commercial custom of the free offer. 
1. The Regulation 
The FTC permits sellers to use the word “free” to induce a transaction, 
provided that the seller adequately communicate why the offer in fact, has 
a “catch.”293 
When making “[f]ree” ... offers all the terms, conditions and obligations 
upon which receipt and retention of the “[f]ree” item are contingent 
should be set forth clearly and conspicuously at the outset of the offer 
so as to leave no reasonable probability that the terms of the offer might 
be misunderstood.294 
                                                 
287 Id. at 52–53. 
288 See Robert E. Marks, There’s No Such Thing as Free Lunch, 31 AUSTRALIAN J. OF 
MGMT., no. 2, 2006, at 1; Giles MacDonogh, Shaken and Now and Again, Stirred, FIN. 
TIMES, Aug. 17, 2002, at FT Weekend 11; Graeme Phillips, Milking a Good Story and 
Myth, SUNDAY TASMANIAN, Oct. 6, 2002, at 60; Max Rudin, Beer and America: It Came 
Over with the Mayflower and Stayed on to Be the Unchallenged Drink of Democracy, AM. 
HERITAGE, June 1, 2002, at 28, 33. 
289 See generally MILTON FRIEDMAN, THERE’S NO SUCH THING AS A FREE LUNCH (1975). 
290 See 16 C.F.R. § 251.1(c) (2012). 
291 See Friedman, Free Offers, supra note 23, at 67–71 (2008) (discussing Commissioner 
James M. Mead’s observation that there is something paradoxical about the fact that it is 
lawful to offer something for free as long as the offeror adequately discloses why it is not); see 
also Comment to Federal Trade Commission, Publisher of the Journal of Consumer Affairs 
(Mar. 27, 1969) (on file with author). 
292 See Friedman, Free Offers, supra note 23, at 56. 
293 For a detailed discussion, see id. at 53–55. 
294 16 C.F.R. § 251.1(c) (2012). 
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Under FTC guidelines about the “use of the word ‘free,’”295 a seller can la-
bel an offer “free” so long as nearby, the seller tells the consumer why it is 
not free.296 This commercial tradition survived direct challenges in the first 
half of the twentieth century. The current regulatory regime was effectively 
cemented by the FTC in In re Walter J. Black,297 which involved the use of 
the word “free” in the sale of novels through book clubs.298 Notably, in this 
matter, norms and traditions were given weight by the FTC:299 
The practice in question [use of the word free with full disclosure that the 
free item is conditional on another purchase] is by no means new300 ... This 
continuous use, however, in and of itself, is not reason enough for [the 
FTC] to condone the practice if ... any law require[s] its discontinuance. 
Absent such legislation, [no] ... administrative agency should take it upon 
itself to change a business practice which has been so long prevalent ....301 
In this case, the FTC refused to change a regulation that was firmly 
rooted in tradition, regardless of welfare effects. Commissioner James Mead, 
dissenting in Walter J. Black, seemed intuitively to grasp that the incumbent 
regulatory approach enabled sellers to employ a deceptive bait and switch, 
even though he did not use bait-and-switch language.302 
As Mead wrote about the “free” books: 
The ... books are either free or they are not free. They cannot be both. 
The advertisements [represent that] the books are free. Elsewhere in the 
advertisements is the statement which indicates that such books are not 
free. At best, these statements are contradictory. One of the statements 
must be contrary to fact. This is obviously the statement that the books 
are free .... 
A seller may not make one representation in one part of his advertise-
ment and withdraw it in another part since there is no obligation on the 
part of the customer to protect himself against such a practice by pur-
suing an advertisement to the bitter end.303 
                                                 
295 See Commission Guide Concerning Use of the Word “Free” and Similar Represen-
tations, 16 C.F.R. § 251.1(e) (2012). 
296 16 C.F.R. § 251.1(e). 
297 In re Walter J. Black, Inc., 50 F.T.C. 225, 225 (1953). 
298 Id. at 225. 
299 See Friedman, Free Offers, supra note 23, at 65. 
300 Walter J. Black, 50 F.T.C. at 232 (noting that this business practice “has been used 
by businessmen ... for almost 100 years”). 
301 Id. (emphasis added). 
302 For an analysis of Mead’s dissent, see Friedman, Free Offers, supra note 23, at 67–68. 
303 Walter J. Black, 50 F.T.C. at 239 (Mead, Comm’r, dissenting) (emphasis added) 
(quoting Mead’s opinion in In re Book-of-the-Month Club, 50 F.T.C. 778 (1954)). 
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Mead not only identified the contradiction inherent in the free-offer tra-
dition, he called out one of the core elements of the advertising tactic. The 
word “free” is used by sellers in advertisements to draw attention to an of-
fer, only to reveal that the underlying deal is something different. The offe-
ror is not sincerely desiring to provide the consumer with a gift; the offeror 
is attempting to use the free offer as “bait” to capture the consumer’s atten-
tion to generate a transaction. 
The majority in Walter J. Black had offered the notion that the custom 
was prevalent, implying that consumers already had internalized the tactic 
through absorption of the practice. 304  In an early free-offer case from 
1925, John C. Winston Co. v. FTC,305 the Third Circuit firmly embraced 
this notion in a case where the FTC attempted to crack down on tactics 
involving the marketing of free encyclopedias associated with costly sup-
plements.306 The Third Circuit pushed back on the FTC, stating that “[i]t is 
conceivable that a very stupid person might be misled by this method ... 
yet measured by ordinary standards of trade and by ordinary standards of 
the intelligence of traders, we cannot discover that it amounts to an unfair 
method of competition ....”307 
Note that in the enforcement of traditional bait and switch, policymak-
ers had been reluctant to embrace this notion of “ordinary standards of the 
trade” and “intelligence of the traders.” There was no discussion anywhere 
about the established tradition of bait and switch in the retail store, the 
grocery, or the home products salesman pulling off tactics that would fool 
“only the very stupid.” With free offers, however, this discussion was ex-
plicit. The free offer form of bait and switch was deemed acceptable, in 
spite of its internal contradiction and potential for deception. 
Free offers tamper with the consumer’s ability to assess true prices of 
goods, with the value of bundled offerings, and with the consumer’s socio-
logical impulse to reciprocate when given what appears to be a gift.308 The 
cognitive error that can be induced by these factors could diminish welfare. 
In this instance, tradition triumphs over economics and perhaps other moral 
marketplace values. 
                                                 
304 See id. at 234 (majority opinion). 
305 John C. Winston Co. v. FTC, 3 F.2d 961 (3d Cir. 1925). 
306 See id. at 962. 
307 Id. (emphasis added). 
308 See Friedman, Free Offers, supra note 23, at 72–73. 
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These other values were expressed in the comments provided to the 
FTC during the two-year notice and comment period309 that led the adop-
tion of the modern Guide Concerning Use of the Word “Free” and Simi-
lar Representations in 1971.310 The comments show that industry strongly 
backed the status quo, arguing that consumers enjoyed and benefitted from 
this promotional technique.311 The few consumer groups that participated 
in the comment period attacked the rule using moral language that cri-
tiqued the norm. The Council on Consumer Information312 returned to the 
basic question, “If I can’t get it without buying something, how can any-
one by any stretch of the imagination call it free?”313 and “encouraged ... 
the commissioners to do everything in [their] power to encourage morality 
in the marketplace.”314 The Council concluded with this kicker: “I think it 
is too bad the marketers have corrupted the definition of the word free and 
I will be disappointed if the FTC continues to allow this corruption.”315 
However, one wishes to characterize the free-offer regulations—either a 
long prevalent business practice that would only “confuse the very stupid” or 
an immoral “corruption”—the FTC continued to allow the practice. Custom 
and the failure to win the argument on moral grounds trumped welfare ad-
vancement in this instance. 
                                                 
309 See Federal Trade Commission Guide Concerning Use of Word “Free” and Similar 
Representations: Notice of Opportunity to Present Written Views, Suggestions, or Objec-
tions, 34 Fed. Reg. 5444 (Mar. 20, 1969). 
310 16 C.F.R. § 251 (2012). The author thanks Professor Chris Hoofnagle for sharing the fruits 
of his Freedom of Information Act request to the FTC. The comments are on file with the author. 
311  Typifying the bulk of the comments, the Association of National Advertisers 
(ANA) argued that the consumer understood the tradition: 
Free offers and similar representations have always ranked high in consumer 
favor among the promotional techniques commonly employed .... [I]t is only 
because of the strong positive consumer response to such offers that national 
advertisers choose to invest in them. In denying the consuming public the 
benefits of these forms of promotion, the Commission would in fact be acting 
contrary to the interests of those it is charged with protecting. 
Comment to Federal Trade Commission, Ass’n of Nat’l Advertisers (May 15, 1969) (on file 
with author). 
312  The Council appears to be governed by academics in the field of agricultural 
economics and home economics. See Comment to Federal Trade Commission, Publisher of 
the Journal of Consumer Affairs (Mar. 27, 1969) (on file with author). 
313  The Better Business Bureau of Metropolitan Chicago made similar points in its 
recommendations. “1. It should not be accepted if a person, in order to receive the free article, 
is placed under any contractual obligation or commitment. 2. A person should not be required 
to sign for, or purchase any other product, in order to receive the article described as ‘FREE.’” 
Comment to Federal Trade Commission, Better Bus. Bureau of Metro. Chicago (Apr. 25, 
1969) (on file with author). 
314 Id. (emphasis added). 
315 Id. (emphasis added). 
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Distinct from free offers, but similar in nature, are advertising and 
sales tactics that lure consumers with low-priced initial offerings, only to 
have that price or rate hiked once locked in. I label these practices “teas-
ers,” as they tend to unfold in a time sequence. They distinguish them-
selves from free offers, which involve a more instant bait and switch be-
cause the free offer and associated condition are absorbed by the consumer 
almost at the same time. 
Arguably, consumers are more tightly tied into relationships with teas-
er credit card companies than they are with aggressive retail outlets. A re-
tail customer can physically walk out even if there is a psychological pull, 
but a credit card customer cannot easily escape paying a new higher rate 
on a large balance. 
Even though teasers are not covered by classic bait-and-switch regula-
tion, I also include them in the bait-and-switch family, just like free offers. 
Consumers who have been teased by a credit card may feel “bait-and-
switched.” The students at risk of losing their merit scholarships after their 
first year at Golden Gate University Law School articulated exactly that 
about their commercial relationship with the school. Beyond the formal 
walls of bait and switch, understanding which teasers have been held in 
disfavor by policymakers and which have not can further our understand-
ing of the role of norms, custom, and welfare advancement. 
C. Teasers: Credit Cards and Scholarships 
In discussing teasers, I first describe the evolution and sudden regula-
tion of the credit card industry. As I note, credit cards play a significant 
role in our consumer economy. Although the industry is well established, 
cultural change led to sudden changes in the credit card legal regime. I 
link and compare the credit card example with the complicated regime of 
law school merit scholarships. Some of these scholarship-losing law stu-
dents described a similar feeling to that of credit card holders. Regardless 
of disclosures about retention of the scholarship being dependent on main-
taining a level of academic standing, they were lured into an offering with 
a rate or pricing that they believed they had reason to be able to maintain, 
only to find that when the situation changed, they were trapped into pay-
ing more. Credit card regulations changed quickly and dramatically 
through private or public regulation, while law school merit scholarship 
practices have changed a bit more slowly. By understanding the role of 
culture and norms in bait-and-switch regulation, we can better compre-
hend the dynamics that drove those results. It might also help instruct ag-
grieved law students about what they should do to realize any further re-
forms they seek from law schools. 
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1. Credit Card Regulation 
Credit cards emerged in primitive form in the 1920s,316 but John C. 
Biggins, an enterprising executive at the Flatbush National Bank of Brook-
lyn, receives credit for inventing the modern card in 1947.317 By 1958, 
American Express would issue its first piece of plastic.318 As banks began to 
coalesce around Master Charge and BankAmericard during the 1960s, cred-
it cards proliferated, with 29 million Americans having used a bank card on 
at least one occasion.319 By 2008, roughly 177 million Americans would 
carry credit cards, constituting nearly eighty percent of consumers.320 
Until 2009, however, banks were able to engage freely in certain credit 
card practices that can be labeled colloquially as “bait and switch.” During 
the sixty years prior to the passage of the CARD Act,321 banks could in-
crease rates on customer balances with little notice,322 for hair-trigger cus-
tomer missteps,323 and could revoke introductory and promotional rates 
quickly.324 Through the CARD Act, Congress bluntly impaired the ability 
of banks to use teasers or to bait-and-switch.325 
In light of these manifold social welfare justifications, why did it take 
decades for Congress suddenly to curtail these practices? The economic 
rationale for the CARD Act was that before the regulatory intervention, 
banks misled consumers into a welfare-reducing transactional experience 
that was unanticipated at the time they entered into the credit card agree-
ment. The distributive-based justification rests in the notion that those in 
                                                 
316 Lauren Bielski, Eight Tech Innovations That Took Banking into the 21st Century, 
A.B.A. BANKING J. 87–88 (Nov. 2008). 
317 LEWIS MANDELL, THE CREDIT CARD INDUSTRY: A HISTORY 26 (1990). 
318 Ben Woolsey & Matt Schulz, Credit Card Statistics, Industry Facts, Debt Statistic: 
History, CREDITCARDS.COM, http://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news/credit-card-in
dustry-facts-personal-debt-statistics-1276.php (last visited Mar. 23, 2013). 
319 JOSEPH NOCERA, A PIECE OF THE ACTION: HOW THE MIDDLE CLASS JOINED THE 
MONEYED CLASS 62 (1994). 
320 KEVIN FOSTER ET AL., THE 2008 SURVEY OF CONSUMER PAYMENT CHOICE, FED. 
RESERVE BANK OF BOSTON 56 (2010), available at http://www.bos.frb.org/economic/pp
dp/2009/ppdp0910.pdf. 
321 See Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, Pub. L. 
No. 111-24, 123 Stat. 1734, 1735 (2009) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
322 See § 101(a), 123 Stat. at 1736–37. 
323 An example of a misstep is the consumer’s failure to make the minimum payment 
within sixty days of the due date. See § 101(b), 123 Stat. at 1736–37. 
324 See § 101(b), 123 Stat. at 1738 (adding limits on introductory and promotional rates). 
325 See Credit Card Accountability and Disclosure Act of 2009. The Federal Trade 
Commission has its own guidance on “bait” within its jurisdiction. See 16 C.F.R. § 238 
(2012). Banks are regulated by the Comptroller of the Currency and the states. 
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financial difficulty are affected more deeply than others when the balance 
rate suddenly changes.326 These economic justifications for regulation ex-
isted for many years, but the justifications became more visible during the 
onset of a financial crisis.327 
One question to address is whether a custom should naturally emerge 
here, per Epstein’s model. In theory, custom should emerge more readily 
in the routinized world of credit transactions. Credit cards were commonly 
used by 2008.328 To the extent there was asymmetry prior to 2008, con-
sumers were shopping with credit cards without factoring in the probabil-
ity of events that would lead to rate hikes. When banks accumulated more 
leverage over individual consumers and were perceived to abuse their 
power over consumers, the custom failed, and a new set of norms led to 
the change in the law. 
The sudden change in bait-and-switch regulation with consumer credit 
cards was rooted in the sudden cultural storm and populist revolt that ac-
companied the financial crisis. When the consumer economy was strong, 
the tactics employed by the banks might not have proven as visible or 
broadly impactful. However, trust in public institutions tends to be shaken 
by business cycle events.329 According to Gallup, the number of Ameri-
cans saying “they have a great deal/quite a lot” of confidence in banks cra-
tered from fifty-three percent in 2004 to twenty-three percent in 2009.330 
By early 2009, an unmistakable political and social wave overwhelmed 
the established customs of retail banking and its regulation—the dramatic 
new norm drove a political effort to tighten controls on the financial sector, 
                                                 
326 People facing employment difficulty are more likely to be late on payments, as one 
would expect. See Saskia Scholtes, Credit Card Delinquencies Climb to Record While 
Loan Write-Offs Soar, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2009), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2325260c-f
326-11dd-abe6-0000779fd2ac.html#axzz27pPg3uzX. Access requires subscription. 
327 By early 2009, while the CARD Act was being passed, the depth of the global 
crisis was apparent. The International Monetary Fund deemed the slowdown, “the 
deepest post-World War II recession by far.” WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK APRIL 2009: 
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329 See generally Betsey Stevenson & Justin Wolfers, Trust in Public Institutions Over 
the Business Cycle 101 AM. ECON. REV. 281 (2011). 
330 Dennis Jacobe, Americans’ Confidence in Banks Falls to Record Low, GALLUP 
ECON. (June 27, 2012), http://www.gallup.com/poll/155357/Americans-Confidence-Banks
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particularly in the face of a deep recession.331 The CARD Act was part of 
this effort. Before the 2008 financial crisis, over half the public expressed 
confidence in banks, muffling any clarion call for regulating banking be-
havior. When public confidence in banks dropped through the floor, the 
political system absorbed the cultural change and, among a slew of other 
reforms,332 cracked down on particular bait-and-switch-like practices in 
the credit card banking sector. These practices had accumulated over time 
but were shaken loose by this shift. 
The CARD Act emerged from a scenario where culture and economic 
welfare interests suddenly aligned, but after a major cultural shock.333 In 
the end, cultural change motivated regulatory driven changes in industry 
custom—changes that may have aligned with consumers having more cer-
tainty about their credit card agreements and fewer surprises. Even if the 
practice did drive up rates, at the very least, consumers would have more 
certainty about their offering because it was less confusing. That alone 
could enhance welfare. 
In many ways, the credit card changes reinforce the observations that 
emerged in the retail grocery bait-and-switch regulation. The initial regu-
lation of bait and switch in retail grocery regulation was driven by the po-
litical wave of the War on Poverty, according to the FTC report that 
helped to inform the change.334 The loosening of the grocery store rules 
occurred in an era where a wave of deregulation pulled the regulation 
back. Both retail-grocery rule changes relied on economic studies, but the 
substance of the studies reflected political culture intersecting with cus-
tom. Here, the credit card changes reflected the fact that consumers were 
hurt more when the economy slowed down sharply. 
                                                 
331  A vast amount of literature, academic and popular, supports this observation. For 
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2. Law School Merit Scholarships 
Law school merit scholarships illustrate a potential difference between 
traditional bait and switch and teasers. Golden Gate University Law 
School,335 for example, may certainly have deployed merit scholarships to 
compete for better students336 with the lure of discounted first-year tuition 
and the promise that continued academic merit would ensure the continued 
discount.337  Disclosure of the basic conditions of scholarship retention 
renders unclear the notion of whether Golden Gate’s practices would meet 
traditional definitions of deception or insincerity. 
In 2011, law students contended that they were not receiving what they 
had bargained for when they matriculated at Golden Gate—and that sunk 
costs were keeping them in a position where they had to pay full tuition for 
their remaining two years if they did not retain their scholarships.338 Further, 
some of them observed that law schools “offer more scholarships than [they] 
plan[] to renew,” which they deemed an insincere approach, even with disclo-
sures that the scholarship must be earned to be retained in future years.339 
Before the ABA reformed law school scholarship rules in August, 
2012,340 merit scholarships involved a truthful but limited disclosure to a 
sophisticated group of consumers who remained prone to the optimism bi-
as.341 Generally, the disclosure pre-2012 focused on the conditional nature 
of the scholarship, specifically that the scholarship could only be retained 
after the first year if specific academic standards (grade point averages 
(GPAs)) were satisfied. The actual aggregate GPA distributions were not as 
clear, and a student might not be able to assess the likelihood of retaining 
the scholarship without that information. Further, the scholarship recipient 
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336 A law school may compete for better students to improve U.S. News & World Report 
rankings. Merit scholarships induce students with high LSAT and grade points to matric-
ulate, boosting the school’s position in the U.S. News formula. See Jerome Organ, How 
Scholarship Programs Impact Students and the Culture of Law School, 61 J. L. EDUC. 173, 
176 (2011). Another advantage of enrolling students with better profiles may be the true 
institutional benefit of having an academically stronger student body. 
337 See Segal, supra note 1, at BU6. 
338 See id. 
339 See id. at BU1. 
340 See Standard 509(e), supra note 1. 
341 The optimism bias reflects the irrational belief that a negative event is less likely to 
happen to oneself than to others. See David A. Armor & Shelley E. Taylor, When Predictions 
Fail: The Dilemma of Unrealistic Optimism, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY 
OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 334, 337 (2002). 
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might have an unwarranted belief that a merit scholarship would indicate 
that the school had absolute confidence in the student’s ability to succeed 
and surpass the GPA threshold.342 
The critical part of the 2012 reform is the requirement that schools public-
ly disclose scholarship retention on the school website and distribute the in-
formation to all receiving a conditional scholarship.343 Even with this addi-
tional disclosure, however, students may still find themselves prone to the 
optimism bias, and feel like the pricing of their education was “switched” 
dramatically, if their GPAs did not meet the specified standard. Only an out-
right ban on conditional scholarships would fully eliminate this phenomenon. 
The alternative to a merit scholarship regime does not necessarily in-
crease welfare or accrue to the benefit of students. No matter how the analysis 
is sliced, the merit scholarship marketing tactic is ultimately a form of price 
competition for matriculants. 344  Moreover, if law schools agreed not to 
compete on net price, they could be susceptible to an antitrust challenge;345 
welfare would be affected in an unpredictable way.346 
If all merit scholarships are banned, or even if merit offerings are damp-
ened by the recent standards change, law school net revenue might be unaffect-
ed. Would schools then charge the same net tuition to all students, regardless of 
merit? Would schools shift more toward investing in guaranteed scholarships to 
support needs-based admission? Or would schools invest the resources in facul-
ty salaries or facilities development? One can only speculate. 
The dynamics of competition for the law school matriculant—a competi-
tion that might accelerate in a market where applicant numbers are drop-
ping347—could have profound and broader effects than one might anticipate. 
The remedy that the Golden Gate Law School students are seeking through 
                                                 
342 See Segal, supra note 1, at BU1. 
343 Standard 509(e), supra note 1. 
344 See Chelsea Phipps, Law Schools Bargain with Students to Fill Seats, WALL ST. J. L. 
BLOG (Jul. 30, 2012, 10:57 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2012/07/30/law-schools-bargai 
n-with-students-to-fill-seats/ (describing the competitive market for law students, the role of 
scholarships in competition for the students, and the magnitude of the growth of scholarship 
allocations over the past decade). 
345 The closest analogue to such a challenge involved the FTC’s investigation of the 
collusion of undergraduate schools on fixing needs-based scholarship awards. For a summary 
of the action, which led to a settlement in the form of a consent decree, but continued to be 
litigated by one defendant, see United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 661 (3d Cir. 1993). 
346 See generally Caroline M. Hoxby, Benevolent Colluders? The Effects of Antitrust 
Action on College Financial Aid and Tuition, at ii (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 7754, 2000) (discussing the ambiguous effect of eliminating collusion 
among elite colleges on needs-based financial aid). 
347 See LSAC Resources, LSAC, http://www.lsac.org/lsacresources/data/three-year-vol
ume.asp (last visited Mar. 23, 2013). 
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the ABA accreditation process, the legislative process, and civil redress, 
might have any number of unintended reverberations. The “sticker price” 
for tuition might drop for all students, but for merit students, it is possible 
that “meritocracy” in the form of financial reward would erode. Would 
this advance welfare? Would it enhance student capture of welfare? 
The ultimate outcome here should reflect the nature and dynamics of 
the culture and custom more than welfare. As Epstein would predict, cus-
tom does not emerge to define roles well. A legal education is a one-time, 
big-ticket purchase (low frequency, high severity) with asymmetric posi-
tioning of buyer and seller.348 This dynamic might explain the Golden 
Gate law students’ surprise. In a custom “vacuum,” surprises like the loss 
of big-ticket scholarships emerge. Presumably, the extended campaign of 
the students may have generated pressure where there was a cultural vacu-
um, leading to modest reform. 
Law students have indeed begun to find regulatory traction and achieve 
reform on this scholarship issue, and may find more gains in other are-
as.349 This reform effort took a great deal of time, even in the face of a cri-
sis, possibly because it was challenging to obtain substantial cultural sym-
pathy toward the plight of future lawyers. If culture drives regulation, 
there was only a weak culture backing reform of law school merit scholar-
ship practices, even if other practices were under tighter scrutiny.350 
Though there were some exchanges between elected officials and the 
ABA,351 and now some mild disclosure reform, it does not appear that 
law students have broadly shocked the public conscience—or permeated 
                                                 
348 Although a law school arguably has incentive to maintain long-term good relations 
with students and alumni post-transaction. 
349 Projects like Law School Transparency are attempting to gain traction in a lot of 
areas, most notably employment statistics reporting. See LAW SCHOOL TRANSPARENCY, 
http://www.lawschooltransparency.com (last visited Mar. 23, 2013). The rest of Standard 
509 requires more law school “consumer disclosure,” especially in the area of employment. 
See Standard 509(e), supra note 1. 
350 Although the arguments about transparency about law school employment and 
other transparency has received substantial attention. For a scholarly view, see generally 
BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS (2012). 
351 The concern from Congress about merit scholarships has been bipartisan. U.S. Sen. 
Barbara Boxer (D-CA) and U.S. Sen. Charles E. Grassley (R-IA) asked the ABA to 
respond to the merit scholarship issue raised in the New York Times. See Letter from 
Barbara Boxer to Stephen N. Zack, President of the American Bar Association (May 20, 
2011), http://boxer.senate.gov/en/press/releases/052011.cfm (questioning gaps in ABA’s 
law school statistical reporting); see also Letter from Senator Charles E. Grassley to 
Stephen N. Zack (Jul. 11, 2011), http://www.grassley.senate.gov/about/upload/2011-07-11
-Grassley-to-ABA.pdf (inquiring about law school accreditation and merit scholarships, 
among other accreditation issues). 
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regulatory consciousness—in the same way that the treatment of low-
income consumers, or the victims of crafty aluminum siding salesmen, or 
sleazy retailers have.352 The Federal Trade Commission and the Depart-
ment of Education have been absent from the law school scene. As noted, 
private litigation may prove to be the ultimate vehicle to seek remedy and 
provide the publicity to drive change.353 Public statements of the legal ad-
vocates involved in class actions have certainly been strong, but such a 
message has yet to achieve tangible results in a courtroom or beyond.354 
To conclude the merit scholarship analysis, the law students who lose 
these scholarships may indeed feel they were baited. This could certainly 
feel akin to having a low credit card rate on a large balance suddenly rise 
for an unanticipated but foreseeable reason. In both cases, exposure to dis-
closure, even the enhanced disclosure brought about in 2012, might have 
limited effect.355 The impact of being switched to a high rate on a credit 
                                                 
352 The ABA changed its posture somewhat when it promulgated the new standard. 
Originally, in a response memorandum to Senator Grassley, the ABA had maintained that 
“the issue with merit scholarship retention is not based on any ‘bait-and-switch’ intention 
by law schools, but arises because of the affected students’ failure to maintain the 
required grade point average or class rank.” Bruce Buckley, A Scholarship Bait and 
Switch?, THE NATIONAL JURIST (Sept. 2011) at 16. The ABA noted that students had 
prior notice about scholarship retention guidelines, and further pointed out that in the 
aggregate, the number of scholarship recipients and allocated dollars had risen. 
Memorandum from the Section of Legal Education and Admission to the Bar to Senator 
Charles E. Grassley, ABA (July 20, 2011). From 2005 to 2010, scholarship recipients 
increased from 60,000 students to 69,000 students, while scholarship dollars increased 
sixty-seven percent. Id. at 2. Concededly, this is simply the ABA’s report. Further 
analysis might yield more nuances about these numbers. Again, the point is that the law 
students have struggled to capture the cultural high ground required on this issue to take 
on the legal education industry. 
353 See Staci Zaretsky, Calling All Disgruntled Law School Graduates: Will You Ring in 
the New Year by Suing Your School?, ABOVE THE LAW (Dec. 14, 2011, 4:02 PM), http://
abovethelaw.com/2011/12/calling-all-disgruntled-law-school-graduates-will-you-ring-in-the
-new-year-by-suing-your-school/. 
354 Plaintiffs’ attorney David Anziska said, “These law schools are using a Nuremburg 
defense. In the law, this isn’t a valid defense. When they try to make this argument saying, 
‘[O]h, everyone else does it,’ it’s just an absurd argument.” Id. Whether this rhetoric will 
spark the cause or overstate it remains to be seen. 
355 See generally Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated 
Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 647 (2011) (arguing that widespread mandatory disclosure 
has failed to protect consumers and may cause harm); Howard Latin, “Good” Warnings, 
Bad Products, and Cognitive Limitations, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1193 (1994) (arguing marginal 
information can prove insufficient to overcome the optimism bias). For the challenge 
presented by consumer optimism in the credit card context, see Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by 
Plastic, 98 N.W. U. L. REV. 1373, 1375–76 (2004) (discussing the consumer’s optimism 
bias or estimation difficulties in the context of credit cards). Consumers tend to underestimate 
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card can be costly, even financially devastating, just as failing to renew a 
scholarship can be. Though some have filed lawsuits, 356  raised ques-
tions,357 or called for specific action358 about regulating law school admis-
sions and financial aid practices that have the “feel” of bait and switch, 
only modest reform in the nature of disclosure has resulted.359 This stands 
in sharp contrast to what happened with credit card regulation. 
Custom and norms may serve to explain more crisply why law school 
merit scholarships have not historically been closely regulated, as opposed 
to credit card rate switches.360 Free offers may fall into the same trap—the 
economics are ambiguous at best, but the custom is cemented. The pre-
scription for the perpetually churning group of law students in this posi-
tion would be to find a way to lobby on a sustained basis to change the 
culture of the commerce of legal education—or perhaps to aim more 
                                                                                                                         
the probability and impact of a negative event causing unfavorable triggers to their 
balances; in the law school context, the blogosphere has offered a debate about merit 
scholarships, bait and switch, and disclosure. See Jeff Lipshaw, The Irony of Requiring 
Meritorious Performance to Maintain a Law School Merit Scholarship, LEGAL PROF. BLOG 
(May 1, 2011), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/legal_profession/2011/05/the-irony-of
-requiring-meritorious-performance-to-maintain-a-law-school-merit-scholarship.html (express-
ing skepticism about the effectiveness of disclosure on the cognitive biases of students). Cf. 
Proposing a New Standard to Require Scholarship Retention, LAW SCHOOL TRANSPARENCY 
BLOG (Apr. 30, 2011, 9:27 PM), http://www.lawschooltransparency.com/2011/04/propos
ing-a-new-standard-to-require-scholarship-retention-information/ (offering proposed stan-
dards of disclosure for law schools in light of the author’s observation that “[i]ssues arise 
... when the combination of opaque grading curves and conditions bound to that curve 
obfuscate the meaning of the terms and limit a prospective [student]’s ability to understand 
the expected value of [a merit] scholarship”). 
356 See Class Action Complaint, supra note 26, at 2–4. 
357 See, e.g., Letter from Senator Charles E. Grassley (R-IA), supra note 351; see also 
Letter from Senator Barbara Boxer (D-CA), supra note 351. 
358 See, e.g., Proposing a New Standard to Require Scholarship Retention, supra note 355. 
359 In this Article, I am neutral about the normative outcome of the merit scholarship debate. 
I merely seek to briefly describe the nature of the debate and explain the potential outcome. 
360  Though it is tempting to explain the difference by pointing to the powerful 
accreditation tandem of the American Bar Association and the American Association of 
Law Schools, the influence of the law school education interests pales in comparison to the 
power of banking interests. For one recent political assessment, see, e.g., Paul Blumenthal 
& Dan Froomkin, Auction 2012: How the Bank Lobby Owns Washington, HUFF POST 
POLITICS (Jan. 30, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/30/auction-2012-bank 
s-lobby-washington_n_1240762.html (quoting Georgetown Law Professor Adam Levitin, 
“They make an awful lot of campaign contributions .... They aren’t making those just out of 
the goodness of their heart. They’re hoping that it gets them some influence. It certainly gets 
them an audience at the very least ... I think it’s hard for your average citizen to understand the 
intensity of lobbying of both people on the Hill and in government agencies.”). 
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broadly to address developing issues in the commercial structure of all 
higher education.361 
D. “Lawful” Bait and Switch 
Many common marketing, advertising, and sales practices land just on 
the other side of lawfulness from traditional bait and switch. Exploring 
briefly why these common practices are lawful can also inform the weigh-
ing of the role of customs and norms. 
“Lawful” bait and switch occurs with abundance. Virtually every flavor 
of retail environment consumers enter, physically and virtually, is designed 
to steer and route consumers to switch to buying more things or a more 
profitable item.362 The walk through a supermarket to buy milk in the back 
aisle, through a maze of aisles and displays,363 is a walk that could have 
been engineered by the designer of a Las Vegas casino.364 The search for a 
book on an online store produces one-click icons to buy other books, pre-
sumably to lure the consumer to buy more inventory.365 
A sales clerk might suggest that a customer try on a certain article of 
clothing first in order to contrast it subsequently against the article the 
store would really like to sell. Does this first “try-this-shirt-on” effort re-
flect the “sincerity” that the FTC seeks in assessing whether activity 
amounts to bait and switch? This instance shows that sincerity is a matter 
of degree, a matter of practicality—and a matter of custom. If the store is 
willing to sell that first item, that seems to obviate the need for inquiring 
                                                 
361 These large issues abound and could become the focus of a broader populist-driven 
change in the commercial relationship between parents, students, and institutions of higher 
education. See, e.g., ANDREW DELBANCO, COLLEGE: WHAT IT WAS, IS, AND SHOULD BE 
121–22 (2012) (warning that four-year liberal arts education is becoming available only to 
the very wealthy and that this phenomenon is unhealthy to American democracy). 
362 See PATRICK M. DUNNE ET AL., RETAILING 485 (2008). 
363 See Arnold Anderson, Retail Layout Strategies, CHRON.COM, http://smallbusiness
.chron.com/retail-layout-strategies-11464.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2013) (“The layout 
of aisles should be a horseshoe design that brings customers through the front door with 
impulse products and some high-demand items, works customers to the back of the store 
with higher-priced items and then allows them to exit through aisles of more impulse 
items at the cash register locations.”). 
364 See Jonah Lehrer, The Psychology of Casinos, WIRED (Mar. 31, 2012), http://www
.wired.com/wiredscience/2012/03/the-psychology-of-casinos/. 
365 For Amazon.com’s patent on technology that pushes advertisements for sale of other 
books the customer might like, see United States Patent No. 7,113,917 B2, GOOGLE 
PATENTS (Sept. 26, 2006), available at http://www.google.com/patents?id=dtp6AAAAEB 
AJ&printsec=abstract&zoom=4&source=gbs_overview_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false. 
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about sincerity. The law does not require sincerity to rise to the level of 
insisting that the seller have equal enthusiasm for selling each of its wares. 
Custom dictates that the marketplace expects some degree of mild 
bait-and-switch activity from retailers and custom influences the fact that 
this activity is lawful. Showing a customer one item to encourage the pur-
chase of another, physically guiding a customer by an impulse-buy item 
on the way to a planned purchase, using a free offer—it all synchronizes 
within our norms, custom, and culture. Regulating this type of behavior 
would prove impossible, if not unthinkable, and would prove inconsistent 
with the FTC’s stated aspiration not to unduly burden commercial activi-
ty.366 In fact, generating these consumer transactions likely would produce 
the very exchanges that will advance welfare. Deception, in the spirit of 
section 5 of the FTC Act, does not really prowl near.367 
Even though permitting these tactics puts the seller at some advantage, 
the tactics are within a familiar boundary of our culture and do not involve 
undue pressure. The symmetry between buyer and seller in most retail envi-
ronments,368 and the ability to shop elsewhere with ease, reduces the impact 
of the sunk cost fallacy and involves low transaction costs that enable the 
consumer to escape. 
In many bait-and-switch environments that are culturally unacceptable, 
the consumer has difficulty escaping because of the sunk cost fallacy or the 
absence of retailer choice. In those that are acceptable, like free offers, the 
consumer has comparatively more choice. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS 
A broad look at bait-and-switch practices reveals findings both about 
the regulatory approach to bait and switch and potentially for regulation 
generally. As I have described in detail and with specificity, custom and 
norms explain the orientation of the regulatory approach much more than 
welfare advancement. This same phenomenon can be observed in the 
drafting of the UCC and even in the development of torts jurisprudence. 
For “traditional” bait and switch, the cultural custom and norms are rein-
forced through the regulatory approach. The anti-deception mandate in sec-
tion 5 of the FTC Act rejects insincere offers designed to switch consumers 
                                                 
366 See About the Federal Trade Commission, supra note 9. 
367 Federal Trade Commission Act, Ch. 311, § 5, 38 Stat. 717, 719–24 (1914) (codi-
fied at 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)). 
368 Low-income area retailers should always be scrutinized, as the case studies in Part 
III demonstrate. 
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to other products.369 This aligns with welfare advancement, as transactions 
that are a byproduct of deception from the seller can destroy utility for the 
buyer and generate general distrust in the market. The regulatory disfavor 
for traditional bait and switch prevents a race to the bottom that would 
immerse the consumer in a marketplace of sharks. A market where tradi-
tional bait and switch prevails could function if consumers were on their 
guard. Perhaps such a market could function well in cultures that embrace 
aggressive haggling as part of the transactional process—but not in the 
American market culture. 
Similarly, culture dominates in guiding permissive “free offer” regula-
tion—as the tactic can confuse consumers, cause cognitive error, and de-
stroy welfare. Some have argued that the tactic is inherently misleading.370 
Nonetheless, the centuries-old tradition continues because it is deeply em-
bedded in our commercial culture. Moving further on the spectrum, retail 
grocers were able to use promotions with almost no accountability until 
the culture changed in the 1960s, when the FTC promulgated special 
guidelines for the industry.371 By the 1980s, the larger regulatory culture 
had taken a dramatic political turn, and the guidelines were significantly 
weakened.372 Today, grocers have more room to aggressively deploy spe-
cial deals to lure consumers than other retailers. Economics were used to 
explain both regulatory turns, but the thematic culture (attacking poverty 
in the 1960s and “paperwork” in the 1980s) played the dominant factor. 
In the Introduction, I noted the hunting metaphor employed by the law 
student quoted in the New York Times article. As applied to sales and mar-
keting, when is hunting fair sport? When is it an unfair “turkey shoot”? The 
cultural viewpoint on credit cards shifted, driving regulation that would pre-
vent unfair manipulation of interest rates. The banks’ “hunting practices” 
with the use of low introductory rates as traps were no longer viewed as fair 
sport, but rather as a turkey shoot. Large numbers of trapped consumers fell 
victim373 to the banks’ hunting practices, to follow the metaphor leading 
Congress to intervene. With the law school merit scholarships, perhaps the 
                                                 
369 See FTC § 5, 38 Stat. at 719–20. 
370 Namely, Commissioner James Mead and the consumer advocacy groups have 
argued the tactic is misleading. 
371 Robert Pitofsky et al., Pricing Laws Are No Bargain for Consumers, ANTITRUST 
MAG., Summer 2004, at 62, available at http://www.arnoldporter.com/resources/documents
/Article-Pricing_Laws(7-04).pdf. 
372 Id. at 63. 
373  The thirty-day credit card delinquency rate almost doubled during the period 
between May 2005 and February 2009, from 3.56% to 6.61%. Historical Credit Card 
Interest Rates, CARD HUB, http://www.cardhub.com/edu/historical-credit-card-interest-rates/ 
(last visited Mar. 23, 2013). 
2013] EXPLAINING “BAIT-AND-SWITCH” REGULATION 637 
law students need to make (or continue to make) more strenuous efforts to 
convince Congress and regulators that they are part of the turkey shoot, vic-
tims of unfair hunting practices.374 
If the change in culture necessary for achieving regulatory reform re-
quires the public to have empathy for law school graduates, it might be hard 
to achieve basic reforms. To the public at large, law school graduates, par-
ticularly those who were awarded scholarships, might not be the most com-
pelling poster child for reform in a weak economy. Although this dynamic 
stands completely apart from the moral merits of the law students’ position 
and fails to invoke welfare arguments, it may help explain the difficulty stu-
dents are finding achieving reform of scholarship practices outside of chal-
lenges through class action lawsuits. 
For regulatory change advocates, the broadest prescription one can 
make would be to control and influence the cultural dialogue. Arguments 
invoking welfare advancement do matter, and perhaps ideally should have 
primacy for the regulator. But for advocates, all such welfare arguments 
should always be couched within a cultural context. One can look beyond 
the sphere of commercial arguments to see these arguments at work. For 
one current example that may shed some final light on the previously de-
scribed commercial dynamics, consider government regulation of mar-
riage. Social norms have played a key role in preserving the status quo375 
and in obstructing376 and driving change.377 The same forces of culture are 
at work in bait and switch, but with entirely different stakes. 
Ultimately, in scenarios that are on the margin, policymakers face a dif-
ficult choice. In scenarios where welfare might not be advanced by regula-
tion, would regulation be worth the cost? Other factors that policymakers 
might consider could include whether the regulation would mitigate harsh 
distributional outcomes, or whether the regulation, in reflecting a more 
                                                 
374 Lawsuits may provide a way to force the outcome sooner, both in terms of relief 
and publicity, but the risk of loss may yield a permanent setback. 
375 See Elizabeth S. Scott, Social Norms and the Legal Regulation of Marriage, 86 
VA. L. REV. 1901, 1903–05 (2000). 
376 See Katherine M. Franke, The Politics of Same-Sex Marriage Politics, 15 COL. J. 
GENDER & L. 236, 238 (2006). 
377 See Religion and Attitudes Toward Same-Sex Marriage, PEW FORUM (Feb. 7, 2012), 
http://www.pewforum.org/Gay-Marriage-and-Homosexuality/Religion-and-Attitudes-Toward
-Same-Sex-Marriage.aspx (“The public has gradually become more supportive of granting 
legal recognition to same-sex marriages over the past 15 years, with support increasing more 
steeply in recent years.”). Eight states currently recognize or will recognize same-sex mar-
riage. See Kenneth Chamberlain, MAP: Where Is Same-Sex Marriage Legal, NAT’L J. (May 
9, 2012), http://www.nationaljournal.com/politics/map-where-is-same-sex-marriage-legal
--20120509. 
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“honorable” norm, might enhance confidence in the marketplace. Political 
expedience might pull regulators toward adopting the popular norm, but so-
cial costs should be carefully considered before so doing. 
CONCLUSION 
Bait-and-switch regulation provides an informative illustration for un-
derstanding the larger picture of the role of culture, norms, and custom in 
consumer regulation. Welfare arguments may carry some weight in regu-
lation and may incidentally coincide with the interests driven by norms. 
But it is clear that culture, norms, and custom come first. If the purpose of 
regulation is to advance welfare, perhaps regulators should start with the 
premise that the power of culture generally has primacy. 
This discovery about bait and switch should serve as a cautionary tale 
to lawmakers and regulators to ensure that they are restricting and permit-
ting marketplace behavior for the proper reasons. Additionally, this obser-
vation should serve as a guide to those lobbying for tighter regulation, like 
the law school students, and for those lobbying for looser regulation, like 
the retail grocers, who managed successfully to communicate a change in 
norms using the economic ethos of the day. 
In sum, in this corner of the commercial arena, culture, norms, and 
customs will generally predict the nature of regulation. In the commercial 
regulatory zones, the same broad guidance should apply. 
